Archive for the ‘Personal’ Category

Gender, Gesture, and Composition: The Aesthetics of Conducting in France, 1821 to 1868

Thursday, December 31st, 2009

Abstract

For Berlioz there are clear associations between music and the body: music can have a profoundly sublime affect upon his physical sensations, bypassing his rational mind to produce uncontrollable gestures. When Berlioz took to the podium, however, this relationship become complex; now, it was Berlioz’s physical gestures that had an affect upon the music. The one-way relationship between music and the body became a problematic symbiosis between the two – which influences which, and through what medium?

The medium, as the dissertation will explore, is gesture. Gesture was a blossoming aesthetic genre in Paris at the time: sign-language had been established in the previous century and was becoming more widespread; mime exploded with Gaspard Deburau’s Theatre des Funambles; and, with Habeneck and especially Berlioz, conducting developed a new vocabulary of gestures.

This dissertation will investigate the interdisciplinary connections between these forms of physical gesture, and how they all find a locus in Berlioz’s conducting during this period. Further, it will be argued that in this period the physical gesture of conducting was inexorably wedded to the social concerns with gender ambiguity; that the bodily aspect of conducting was seen not only artistically but also medically; and, how the relationship between the conductor, the composer and the performer became a problematic consideration for Berlioz: in conducting his own works the boundaries between composition and conducting began to dissolve.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Francesca Brittan of Queen’s College, University of Cambridge, for her tireless support of and enthusiasm for this dissertation.

Contents

List of Figures

1  Frédéric Peyson, Last Moments of the Abbé de l’Epée, 1839 (Paris, INJS). It depicts l’Epée on his deathbed surrounded by grieving pupils. At the left side of the picture can be seen the members of the National Assembly led by the Archbishop of Bordeaux, who declared: `Die in peace, the nation will adopt your children.’
2  Jerône-Martin Langlois, The Abbé Sicard Instructing His Deaf Pupils, 1806 (Paris, INJS).
3  By Cham, published in Charivari, 25 November 1855. The caption reads: `What should have been the composition of the orchestra conducted by M. Berlioz in the hall of the Universal Exhibition.’
4  This cartoon was published in Louis Reybaud, Jérôme Paturot à la recherce d’une position sociale (Paris, 1846). The caption reads: `Heureusement la salle est solide… elle résiste!‘ [Fortunately the hall is solid... it can stand the strain!].
5  François-Antoine Habeneck conducting. Drawing by Chalot after a bas-relief by Dantan the Younger. In Adolphe Jullien, Paris dilettante, etc. (Paris, 1884).
6  Berlioz’s indication for the beating of two and three beats in a bar.
7  Berlioz’s indication for the beating of five and seven beats in a bar, combining methods for beating two and three beats.
8  The manual alphabet devised by Bonet and adapted by l’Epée. From J. P. Bonet, Reducción de las Lettras y Arte para Enseñar à Ablar los Mudos (Madrid, 1620).
The electric baton, by Cham in Charivari (2 December 1855). The caption reads: `M. Berlioz takes advantage of his electric baton to direct an orchestra which will have its members in every part of the world.’

`As a conductor of his own compositions he was incomparable [...] His music, frequently rugged in contrasts and daring leaps, is also insinuating and suave at times, and so too was his conducting; one moment he would be high in the air, the next crouched under his desk; one moment he would menace the drummer, and the next flatter the flutist; now he would draw long threads of sound out of the violinists, and anon lunge through the air at the double basses, or with some daring remark help the violoncellists to draw a cantilena full of love-longing out of their thick bellied instruments. His musicians feared him and his demoniac, sarcastic face, and wriggled to escape unscathed from his talons.’

Anton Seidl on Hector Berlioz1

`I remained with him, and hardly had the last member of the band vanished when Berlioz struck his forehead, exclaiming: `I have forgotten the overture!’ He stood speechless for a few minutes, then said with determination: `It shall go nevertheless.’ Now this overture was the one to Le Carnaval Romain, to be performed that evening for the first time, and never rehearsed [...] But to see Berlioz during that performance was a sight never to be forgotten. He watched over every single member of the huge band; his beat was so decisive, his indication of all the nuances so clear and so unmistakable, that the overture went smoothly, and no uninitiated person could guess at the absence of a rehearsal.’

Charles Hallé on Berlioz2

Introduction

The evening of 11 September 1827 marked one of the single most influential events in Hector Berlioz’s life. At the time Berlioz was still an emerging composer, and certainly no conductor. It was almost ten years to the day before he published his article arguing for the ideal `musical effect’ – the strange power that music should hold over the senses – yet that evening Berlioz witnessed an event that had absolute power over him but was not musical at all. It was, in part, completely devoid of sound altogether. The spectacle he was witness to drew its immense power from a palette of expressive gestures, strange bodily contortions and primal screams, through a figure that had all but abandoned rationality.

The young Harriet Smithson took to the Parisian stage as Ophelia in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a production in the original English. Smithson, not speaking a word of French or being a great singer, was performing to an audience few of whom could understand English – Berlioz included. The result was a `musical’ performance of sorts: the audience could only grasp at the meanings from the tones and inflections of her voice and her physical gestures. Indeed, the most powerful moment in the whole play is a typically operatic moment, Ophelia’s mad scene, which relies heavily on body language and gesture. The role of Ophelia was traditionally taken by a singer capable of making something of the several songs in the scene.3

Yet the role itself is a relatively minor one, to which Smithson, a minor actress, was assigned. Her mad scene, however, stole the performance. The innovation that made her an instant star in Paris was her decision to play the scene in expressive pantomime – using physical gestures as the performance medium rather than spoken language or music. As Jules Janin recalled, Smithson was `an embodied revolution’, `when she moved, when she spoke, her charm mastered us. A whole society stirred to the magic of this woman.’4 Shakespeare’s immense success, Berlioz claimed, `was surpassed by Miss Smithson’s. No dramatic artist in France ever touched and excited the public as she did [...] The impression made on my heart and mind by her extraordinary talent, nay her dramatic genius was equalled only by the havoc wrought in me by the poet she so nobly interpreted.’5 As Katherine Kolb Reeve has argued, it was the physicality of and expressive gestures in Smithson’s performance that drew Berlioz into his love obsession with the actress.6

The rhetoric of these two accounts is symptomatic of an aesthetic genre that emerged in Paris between the last decade of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries. Throughout these fifty or so years there was incredible interest in the aesthetics and pathology of the body, of gesture, of movement, and in a philosophical search for a universal `biological’ language.7 In artistic spheres this became manifest in the search for the embodiment and physicality of genius, an exploration of the relationships between abstract inspiration and a very physical, often uncontrollable, bodily reaction.8 Berlioz was wholly caught up in this rhetoric:

On hearing certain pieces of music my vital forces seem to increase twofold; I feel an exquisite pleasure carried to a degree of violence rather entirely independent of my mind; habits of analysis then come of themselves to induce admiration; emotion, which grows in direct proportion to the energy and grandeur of the composer’s ideas, soon produces a strange agitation in my veins; my heart beats violently; tears, which ordinarily signal the end of the paroxysm, frequently mark only a stage of it, to be exceeded by far – in such cases there are spasmodic contractions of all my muscles, a trembling of all my limbs, a total numbing of my hands and feet, a partial paralysis of the optic and auditory nerves, my vision goes dark, I can barely hear; dizziness… near-faint.9

Whilst much has been made of Berlioz the Romantic composer and Berlioz the Romantic man within these intellectual tropes, very little has been studied of Berlioz the Romantic performer. This is in part Berlioz’s own fault – he was, at the best of times, only a mediocre instrumentalist. Hallé wrote that `Berlioz was no executant upon any instrument (for being able to strike a few chords on the guitar does not count) and he was painfully aware how much this was a hindrance to him’ and Richard Wagner remarked, `I had presented him with a copy of my Two Grenadiers, but could never really learn any more from him concerning what he really thought of it from the fact that as he could only strum a little on the guitar, he was unable to play the music of my composition to himself on the piano.’10

Berlioz’s contributions to conducting, however, are unquestioned and well documented as a turning point in the art.11 Despite this, history has chiefly left us with Berlioz the composer as the locus for musicological thought. We easily and frequently debate, for example, the relationships between his Symphony Fantastique and Romanticism, the fantastic, autobiography, and literary criticism, yet rarely do we examine the performance of the work under the composer’s direction, as a piece generated by his physical gestures.12 Similarly, we accept and document Berlioz’s developments as a conductor, yet have not given much consideration of the social and philosophical catalysts behind them.

As a way of investigating this gap left by musicology, this dissertation will attempt to posit the technical and aesthetic developments that Berlioz brought to conducting within the emerging French theories of inspired gesture, sign language, the divided-self of the Romantic artist, and the concept of the genius as a bodily, not abstract, phenomenon. It will investigate a critical dichotomy: between Berlioz as a virtuoso gestural technician and Berlioz as an inspired irrational genius, and how central the presence of this dichotomy is to his reception. It will further explore how the rhetoric and metaphors used to describe the orchestra changed, and how the French musical establishments reacted to Berlioz’s changes.

French Gestural Conservatism

Rousseau [...] directed his satirical comments against the manner of execution which was adopted at the Académie Royale. He called the conductors “woodchoppers” because of the heavy blows which they directed against the desk with a large piece of hard wood. [...] As soon as the movement is felt, and the impulse given, he abandons the singers and the orchestra until the moment when once again they need help in order to accelerate or retard the music.13

The French musical establishment from 1801 to 1867 was surprisingly conservative in its methods of performance direction. Its reluctance to adopt a baton director was symbolic of the establishment being torn between two gestural aesthetics: between the old school of `straight’ monosemic violin-bow direction and the new school of the `inspired’ polysemic gestures under a baton. It was only in 1867 that, symbolically, the last violin-bow director left the Paris Opéra, twelve years after the publication of Berlioz’s L’Art du chef d’orchestre, making France the last country to maintain this tradition by over forty years.14 Surprising because Berlioz and many of his French contemporaries were progressive musicians, and the French had been steadily establishing themselves as the European leaders in the philosophy and practice of expressive gesture – be it sign-language, pantomime, or its theoretical philosophies. Yet, they were almost backwardly afraid of its use; as Elliott Galkin remarks, `while the French were more progressive than musicians in other countries in formulating a theory of time-beating, they remained conservative in its practice.’15 How, and why, did a society that had such a rich and developed history of gestural semantics take so long to attempt to implement them?

When Berlioz first arrived in Paris, and indeed for many years thereafter, the major force in both conducting and Parisian musical politics was François-Antoine Habeneck (1781-1849).16 Habeneck’s insistence on using a bow to conduct, however, did have continual disadvantages: the length and weight of it made it frequently unwieldy; Berlioz indeed complained that for this reason the `saltarello’ in the second act of Benvenuto Cellini could not be played as fast as he wanted.17 Habeneck was also the first major conductor who was not a composer – his speciality lay in his incredible skill at the violin and, perhaps in part, because of this he often concentrated on purely pragmatic aspects of performance.18

Prior to the early nineteenth century, conducting, or musical direction, was essentially a procedure of time-beating: deciding, establishing, and maintaining a tactus for each movement of a piece – issues of musical aesthetic and emotional expression were chiefly the responsibility of the composer, generally not the players, and certainly not the director, and were thus kept removed from the public performance space.19 As quoted above, in 1820 Castil-Blazé wrote of the French insistence on audible time-beating, giving his disapproval of the move towards silent time-beating, as well as providing a description of the traditional unexpressive musical direction. Berlioz himself gave his opinion of the typical conductors he found in `two thirds of the lyric theaters in Europe’:

A single man who has no more idea of the art of conducting that that of singing, who is generally a poor musician, selected from among the worst pianists to be found, or who cannot play the pianoforte at all … some old superannuated individual, who, seated before a battered out-of-tune instrument, tries to decipher a dislocated score which he does not know, strikes false chords, major when they are minor, or vice-versa, and under the pretext of conducting, and of accompanying himself, employs his right hand in setting the choristers wrong in their time, and his left in setting them wrong in their tune.20

Inspired Gesture: The Body of Genius

Considerations of deafness, sign-language, gestural communication, and the origins of language were not minor topics in post-Revolutionary French thought – they were quite central to the new philosophies. The aesthetic shift from the old style of formal violin-bow direction that was typically uninspiring and that kept emotional display to a minimum, to the new style of conductor who sought to inspire and enthuse his musicians did not emerge from nowhere; rather, the gestures, aesthetics, and literature on conducting were all articulations of parallel intellectual moves occurring in the other arts and intellectual circles. Under the loose headings of `inspiration’ and the `fantastic’, we can identify a trope that can be found in French writings from around the 1760s, and which gained momentum and weight over the next seventy years. Works like Victor Hugo’s Hernani (1830) and Han d’Islande (1823), Frédéric Soulié’s Les Mémoires du Diableand (1838), Charles Nodier’s La Fée aux Miettes (1832), and indeed Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique (1830), all came to typify this emerging trope. Philosopher’s such as Denis Diderot – philosopher, principal editor of the Encyclodédie, playwright and art critic – wrote progressively about musical aesthetics, a primary focus of which was on artistic creation, notions of genius, and physical responses to music. The painter Charles-Antoine Coypel, a little earlier, wrote that `the Rules of Declamation are needed for Painting, to reconcile the gesture with the expression on the face [...] by the lively expression of the gestures and actions that mutes ordinarily use to make themselves understood.’21



Figure

Figure 1: Frédéric Peyson, Last Moments of the Abbé de l’Epée, 1839 (Paris, INJS). It depicts l’Epée on his deathbed surrounded by grieving pupils. At the left side of the picture can be seen the members of the National Assembly led by the Archbishop of Bordeaux, who declared: `Die in peace, the nation will adopt your children.’


At the same time as the philosophical postulations made by Diderot, between 1750 and 1830 French philosophers and doctors made extraordinary developments in sign-language, medical understandings of deafness, deaf rights, and the philosophy of the origins of language; indeed, France is generally considered the fatherland of sign-language, making progress decades before other countries even recognised deafness as separate from dumbness or mental illness. Histories of sign-language typically identify France in this period as the pioneers. 22

It was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century that serious attempts were made at formalising, teaching, and understanding gestural language and communication, and these developments were made almost exclusively in Paris by Abbé de l’Epée with his system of “signes méthodiques,” published in 1776 in his Institution des Sourds et Muets, par la voie des signes méthodiques; Ouvrage qui contient le Projet d’une Langue Universelle, par l’entremise des Signes naturels, assujettis à une Méthode.23 The purpose of l’Epée’s work was not the discovery of a universal language, but as a system to educate the deaf. In close association with his pupils therefore, he evolved a language of manual signs that consisted of gestures used naturally and spontaneously by the deaf. In this way he was able to build up a highly developed language of methodical signs that was part natural and part conventional – a stress l’Epée was keen to make – his language was at the same time natural and highly developed, something that Berlioz too would claim a century later. As a medium for instructing the deaf, l’Epée’s work drew immense success, so much so, that by the middle of the next decade, as a result of his public demonstrations, the interest of royalty and scholars, and the continuation of his work in other countries, his work was known widely across Europe. In 1760-62 he opened the world’s first school for deaf in Paris, eventually under Royal Patronage. Whilst there is no concrete proof, it is not impossible that Berlioz would have had contact with the institution during his early years training to be a doctor. After his death in 1789, l’Epée became an iconic figure as the `emancipator of the deaf’; indeed, figure 1 shows a painting by Peyson, which became the first painting by a French deaf artist to gain widespread acclaim when presented at the Salon in 1839.



Figure

Figure 2: Jerône-Martin Langlois, The Abbé Sicard Instructing His Deaf Pupils, 1806 (Paris, INJS).


Following l’Epée’s death, his pupil and successor as Director of the Institution Nationale des Sourds et Muets, Abbé Roch-Ambroise Cucurron de Sicard (figure 2), took l’Epée’s work further in publishing a dictionary of signs in 1808 under the title Théorie des Signes pour l’instruction des Sourds-Muets.24 This dictionary proved a detailed and extensive catalogue of gestural signs, for everything from the names of objects to more complex grammatical constructions. The work of l’Epée and Sicard put the consideration of gestural communication at the forefront of French thinking and scholarship: Condorcet, Garat, Lancelin, Laromiguiére, Destutt de Tracy, Roederer, and de Gérando all gave serious thought to the issue, as indeed had Diderot and Condillac a generation before them. When Berlioz took up the baton the gestural language he developed was not an isolated advance, and neither was it drawn exclusively from outside of France; rather, his conducting aesthetic was a subtle articulation of developing French theories of gesture.

Berlioz: Inspired Genius

Old Habeneck was not the medium of any abstract aesthetic inspiration – he was devoid of genius.25

Both Berlioz’s own accounts of conducting and those of others who saw him conduct are saturated with a new rhetoric not found in descriptions of Habeneck and other earlier modern conductors: a rhetoric of inspiration, genius, madness, enthusiasm, possession, the sublime, and, the examination of all these within the bodily, anatomical spheres. Reeve observed that `when Berlioz heard a concert or an opera, others were likely to hear how it affected him. His responses to music were the very stuff of his letters and reviews, and they were vivid enough to have kept him in business as a critic for thirty years.’26 Francesca Brittan notes an example of Berlioz’s intensity of expression and musical response:

Oh, if only I did not suffer so much!… So many musical ideas are seething within me [...] I feel it with an intense energy, and I shall do it, have no doubt, if I live. Oh, must my entire destiny be engulfed by this overpowering passion?… Everything I’ve suffered would enhance my musical ideas. I would work non-stop… my powers would be tripled, a whole new world of music would spring fully armed from my brain, or rather, from my heart.27

This passage not only outlines a rhetoric of a sublime overwhelming passion, but also an important dichotomy around the conditions for artistic endeavour. This dichotomy is essentially between the rational and the irrational, inspired genius and technical craftsmanship, and was debated intensively at the turn of the nineteenth century. It is found throughout Berlioz’s writings and in other’s accounts of him, and is central to understanding his conducting. Berlioz himself writes in his L’Art du chef d’orchestre:

[The orchestral conductor] should possess – besides the especial talent of which we shall presently endeavor to explain the constituent qualities – other almost indefinable gifts, without which an invisible link cannot establish itself between him and those he directs; the faculty of transmitting to them his feeling is denied him, and thence power, empire, and guiding influence completely fail him.28

The `irrational’ subjection to music that Berlioz felt was noticed by others; Hallé wrote in 1838, early on in Berlioz’s conducting career, of Berlioz’s total immersion in music:

There never lived a musician who adored his art more than did Berlioz; he was indeed “enthusiasm personified”…29

And Camille Saint-Saëns wrote about L’enfance du Christ:

I can perfectly remember the performances that the composer himself directed: they were more lively, more animated than the well-prepared but languid performances to which Édouard Colonne has accustomed us.30

Now, consider the following similar passage:

Thereupon he began to execute a quite extraordinary fugue. At one moment the theme was solemn and full of majesty and at the next light and frolicsome, at one moment he was imitating the bass and the next one of the upper parts. With outstretched arms and neck he indicated the held notes, and both performed and composed a song of triumph in which you could see he was better versed in good music than in good conduct.31

Although sounding similar to accounts of Berlioz, this quotation, not about Berlioz, is taken from Diderot’s Le neveu de Rameau (Rameau’s Nephew), originally written in the 1760s or 1770s, although not published until 1805 in a translation by Goethe. Yet, both the form and content closely echo Berlioz’s conducting. The dialogue takes place between a Diderot like figure and a certain nephew of Jean-Philippe Rameau, a music teacher and professional parasite. Set in a Parisian café frequented by chess players, the end of their conversation turns to a discussion of music. Here and in many parts of Le neveu de Rameau, there is a sense of ceaseless animation and inexhaustible energy coupled with a rapid and frivolous switching of topic and character displayed by the Nephew; characteristics found frequently in descriptions of Berlioz on the podium – his desire to achieve everything at once, to direct and control all the parts simultaneously, to play rather than direct the instruments. Indeed, thirteen years before the publication of L’Art du chef d’orchestre, Berlioz wrote of the influence a conductor must hold over his musicians:

Identifying the players with himself, exciting them by his zeal, animating them with his own enthusiasm, and imparting to them his own inspiration.32

In 1852 Berlioz was employed to lead the newly-formed Philharmonic Society of London in a presentation of Beethoven’s 9th Symphony. Francis Hueffer (1843-1889), and eminent British critic, wrote of Berlioz’s performance:

Berlioz knew the score by heart, and threw his soul into its perfect rendering; and his enthusiasm had communicated itself to every man in the orchestra, and every singer in the chorus.33

The Nephew, `with outstretched arms and neck’, is reminiscent of Berlioz’s early attempts at conducting – in his desire to control and engage aesthetically with music he produces grotesque and unwieldy gestures: as Gaspare Spontini wrote to Berlioz in November 1843, `Producing narrower, less expansive movements, this would cover less space and be less fatiguing for your arm, your head, and the whole of your body, and would give greater clarity and precision.’34

Diderot, in collapsing of the distinction between performance and composition, `[he] both performed and composed a song of triumph’, highlights the challenge to Berlioz’s own conducting and his reception: the complex web of issues surrounding performing one’s own works. Where is the line between composition and performance? Is performance a part of the `work’, or are the two separable acts? If not, what are the implications of someone else performing Berlioz’s compositions? It is further symptomatic of the aesthetic and philosophical challenge already explored by Diderot: must one be moved oneself in order to move others? If composition is the creative, moving, act, then must performance also be, or rather, should the players be moved by the composer’s music and/or his `performance’ on the podium?

On 10 September 1837 Berlioz published an article in Revue et Gazette musicale in which he debated what Reeve has described as the `musical effect’:35 intensely graphical accounts of moving responses to music, leading to moments of convulsive ecstasy and sublimation; moments which are found resonating throughout Berlioz’s music as well as his literature.36 When Berlioz wrote of this `musical effect’ he, like contemporary French scholars, traced his responses to music back to the fabled ones of classical antiquity, citing how his responses were no more unusual or unnatural than those before. Critically though, Berlioz failed to include the fears and outright warnings that Plato in his Republic made about the powers of music: how music is debilitating to men and therefore dangerous to the state; how the subjugation and `ravishment’ that Berlioz exalts were, for Plato, passive, feminine, depraved and reprehensible. For Plato, art in performance was the most dangerous of all – performers were infectious carriers of an unstoppable chain of emotions that bypassed rational control and directly effected the heart. This view was pervasive for Berlioz too, when the point was brought home to him by his own father, whom, violently against Berlioz abandoning his medical training in favour of a career in the Theatre and marrying an actress, wrote that `the state of enthusiasm’ – the classical term for both the effect and the trace like (opium induced) state that artistic creation required – `destroys all the qualities of the heart and makes the men possessed by it weak, immoral, selfish, and contemptible.’37

This dichotomy surrounding the emotional state of a performer, for Berlioz as a conductor, has its roots not only in Plato but also in Classical rhetoric, which stipulated that writers should feel the emotions they write about. `If you would make me weep, you must weep yourself’ (pour me tirer des pleurs, il faut que vous pleuriez) wrote Boileau, the father of French classicism; by logical extension, a performer must weep if he is to make his audience weep.38 For Diderot in the second half of the eighteenth century, these demands for `imaginative sympathy’, as Reeve describes, lie at the heart of his `Conversations on The Natural Son‘. It was to enhance the emotional involvement of the spectator that Diderot recommended the banning of spectators from the stage and a more natural style of acting and movement, and, crucially, that performers should totally identify with their portrayed characters: an audience’s disbelief must be suspended from start to finish. In 1830 French Romanticism truly bloomed with Victor Hugo’s Hernani and Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique, both works that fully embraced Diderot’s mandate: the Symphonie Fantastique, with its programatic autobiographical backdrop and dense intertwining of the spheres of composer and composition, would, in a performance that Berlioz himself conducted, have been the zenith of the problem Diderot saw: Berlioz the conductor was simultaneously the author, the character, and the performer in his musical works.

There are some composers who, when they are conducting their own works, are only too happy if they can avoid making fatiguing demands on the performers. But this kind of modest restraint was not for him [Berlioz] – besides, the difficulties which his compositions present put it completely out of the question.39

Yet, 1830 also saw the posthumous publication of Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le comédien in which he flamboyantly retracted his the core of his earlier argument: the best actors are not the ones who are themselves moved, but rather, those who are emotionally detached and distant from the characters they portray. Only then can they possess the self-mastery required to assume a given role.

This apparent shift in opinion by Diderot also happened to Berlioz and his conducting in the half-decade after Symphonie Fantastique, at precisely the same time that he developed his conducting technique and began to appear in serious roles as a conductor.40 In 1834 he wrote to Mlle Falcon playing Julia in La Vestale, `I caution the singer to resist the musical effect with all her might: she can vent her feelings when she gets backstage’; and he wrote in a review of Fanny Elssler dancing Fenella in Auber’s Muette de Portici in 1837 that `she moves because she is moved, and because she knows nonetheless how to master her emotion, to a certain extent, in order to enable art to maintain its supremacy.’41 By the time Berlioz was an internationally respected conductor in 1863 he wrote, `Despite Boileau, if you would make me weep, you must not weep yourself.’42 It is telling that the development of his technique came in parallel to the emancipation of his emotional evolvement in his conducting, as the next chapter will explore.

Yet this ideological shift hides something of an hypocrisy, or at least disagreement: accounts of Berlioz’s conducting have more in common with Rameau’s Nephew than they do with Berlioz’s own preaching. A little later in the tale, the Nephew begins to describe the beauty and power of music:

(And off he went, walking up and down and humming some of the tunes from L’Isle des fous, Le Peintre amoureux de son modéle, Le Maréchal-ferrant, and La Plaideuse) and now and again he raised his hands and eyes to heaven and exclaimed: “Isn’t that beautiful! God, isn’t it beautiful! How can anyone wear a pair of ears on his head and question it?” He began to warm up and sang, at first softly; then as he grew more impassioned, he raised his voice and there followed gestures, grimaces, and bodily contortions [...] He sang thirty tunes on top of each other and all mixed up: Italian, French, tragic, comic, of all sorts and descriptions, sometimes in a bass voice going down to the infernal regions, and sometimes bursting himself in a falsetto voice he would split the heavens asunder, talking off the walk, deportment, and gestures of the different singing parts: in turn raging, pacified, imperious, scornful.43

The similarities to Seidl’s account quoted earlier, or this by Hiller noting Berlioz’s crazed enthusiasm when on the podium, are clear:

Berlioz had an extraordinary gift. His personality quickly won him the sympathy of his players, which grew as they came to recognize the fire, the clear-sightedness, the utter devotion, body and soul, that he dedicated to the job at hand. If he sometimes appeared, from the outside, to be exerting himself more than was necessary, and if in so doing he attracted the attention of the listener to his platform behavior, this was entirely without self-consciousness; he had no desire to present himself as a virtuoso conductor (the worst species of virtuosos that exists), but was solely interested in giving his music the importance it deserved. [...] His immense inner tension, his anxiety that everything might not go as he wanted it, perhaps made itself too much felt; he didn’t simply stimulate the musicians, he drove them to a frenzy, and even the excellent orchestral players in London complained to me that they were nervous under his direction. But that was their affair – the outcome was superb. 44

Whilst on the surface the language and rhetoric are clearly closely related between these quotations, there are also much deeper connections. In Rameau’s Nephew, at the point quoted above where the Nephew begins to sing, the syntactic separation between the signifier and the signified begins to collapse: the reader is left unsure as to `where’ the music is taking place. There emerges a great deal of ambiguity about the space the music occupies – it is not a literal retelling of an account of the Nephew singing, but rather, it is presented in such a way as to make the reader become part of the music. Thus, the distinction between the composers of the songs and the Nephew’s performances of them is left unsure: is the Nephew making the songs up as he goes along? Clearly not, but why not say so? Because, presumably, the point Diderot is making is that the performer becomes the music he is performing. Further, the entire tale is told in the form of a Platonic dialogue between He and I, surely a deliberate reference to the logicality of classical philosophical texts. Yet, it is precisely at the moment that Romantic music appears – L’Isle des fous, Le Peintre amoureux de son modéle, Le Maréchal-ferrant, and La Plaideuse – that the He/I dichotomy ceases; similarly, Berlioz’s new Romantic music – Symphony Fantastique, Harold in Italy, Faust – deliberately stands in support of the infectious, controlling power of music that Plato feared. Berlioz, then, has a somewhat easier task; he already is the music he’s performing, as he himself composed it. These quotations confirm exactly that – they make very ambiguous the distinction between Berlioz’s music and conducting.

Moving ahead of Diderot by several decades, we come to the musical aesthetics of E. T. A. Hoffmann. In many respects, Hoffmann’s aesthetics are a natural extension of Diderot’s: concepts of Romantic genius and divine inspiration that were also common to Herder, Hamann, and Goethe can easily be traced through Hoffmann. The view of nature as a finite manifestation of the infinite which underpinned this conception of genius was articulated through the aesthetic category of the `sublime’. It was also central to the definition of genius which Kant presented in `Analytic of the Sublime’ in the Critique of Judgement as `the innate mental predisposition through which nature gives the rule to art.’45 Similarly, Herder suggested that a genius is subservient only to the `rules of Nature’ and that he must `abandon himself to the inspiration of the happy hour’ in order to express `passion and feeling’;46 in Aesthetic in nuce: A Rhapsody in Cabbalistic Prose (1762), Hamann emphasised that, as `a counterpart of God in miniature’, the artist music create wholly in accordance with his natural instincts.’47 Goethe stated that `Nature works according to laws she laid down her herself in concord with the Creator; art works according to rules which she has agreed upon with the genius.’48

These conceptions of genius and divine inspiration offer a hypothesis for why Berlioz almost solely conducted his own works. Of all 177 concerts Berlioz conducted in his lifetime, over 100 were just of his own works – he had little desire to conduct other’s music, and usually did so only out of political and programming necessity. Conducting his own works closed the gap between the divine genius creating works from Nature and the audience:

Unhappy composers! Know how to conduct, and how to conduct yourselves well (with or without a pun), for do not forget that the most dangerous of your interpreters is the conductor himself.49

Yet, this conception of genius presented by Diderot, Goethe, Hamann, and Herder is polemical only in so far as it is a reaction against the hegemony of reason in the Enlightenment – against the neoclassical doctrine of mimesis as the basis for the evaluation of art. Where Hoffmann’s aesthetic begins to find real resonance with Berlioz is in its admittance of the grotesque, the insane, the mad, and the ugly into art, and the breaking rather than conformity to pre-established rules. As Wheeler notes, he `strove to replace objective representation of nature with subjective representation of feeling, and the simplicity of ancient art [...] with the complexity and turmoil of [...] the unconscious.50 Hoffman’s account of the composer Heinrich of Ofterdingen in The Singer’s Contest describes how his `wild and distracted condition increased upon him every day; gloomier and more restless grew his glance, paler [...] his cheek’, and how his `songs bewailed the immeasurable pain of earthly existence, and were [...] like the wailing cry of one who is mortally hurt, and longs in vain for death’51 – an account extremely close in rhetoric to accounts of Berlioz composing at the time of the Symphony Fantastique; Friedrich Zelter wrote to Goethe in a letter saturated with the grotesque:

There are some people who can only make their presence felt and call attention to their activities by means of noisy puffing, coughing, croaking, and spitting. One such appears to be Herr Hector Berlioz. The smell of sulphur surrounding Mephistopheles attracts him, so he must sneeze and snort till all the instruments of the orchestra leap around in a perfect frenzy – only not a hair stirs on Faust’s head. Thank you for sending me the music all the same. I shall certainly find an opportunity when I am teaching to make use of the poisonous abscess, the abortion born of horrible incest.52

It was precisely this grotesque aesthetic, however, that came to define the body of Berlioz’s work, and, indeed descriptions of his conducting. But the difficulty for Berlioz came in drawing the line between enthusiasm and insanity, between inspiration and madness, whether consciously or not. This line is a frequent trope in Hoffmann’s descriptions of the fictitious composer Johannes Kreisler, whom he described as a musician in whom `many thought they had observed signs of madness’, who, `was tossed back and forth by his inner visions and dreams as though on an eternally stormy sea’, and who, during his `fantasizing’ at the piano, `reached a point from which he usually plunged into a dark abyss of inconsolable lamentation.’53 Like Kreisler, Berlioz was frequently troubled by both his musical compositions and his conducting, oscillating between certainty and success on the one hand, and despair and failure on the other; between radically breaking from conventional musical aesthetics and wanting to be part of them.54

For Berlioz, on the one hand, as Chantler describes, `Wackenroder’s and Hoffmann’s insistence that the enthusiasm of genius must not be constrained by pre-established rules was intrinsically linked to their evaluation of art by reference to the aesthetic postulate of originality and to their conception of enthusiasm as an innate quality that cannot be taught.’55 Kant too, stated that `genius is a talent for producing something for which no determinate rule can be given [...]; hence the foremost property of genius must be originality’ and that `the artist’s skill cannot be communicated but must be conferred directly on each person by the hand of nature.’56 On the other hand, a developed technique was absolutely necessary to achieve this inspired genius.

Thus the key to the dialectic of Berlioz’s conducting aesthetic is the transmission of his compositional genius: genius cannot be communicated to players by formal technique alone, but rather by some intangible touch of the hand of Nature. Berlioz’s music, so formally and aesthetically different from that before it – either through ignorance, lack of training, or deliberate intent – thus required a new style of conducting to communicate, a style not of the formal violin-bow direction of Habeneck, but of the grotesque, insane, genius. Berlioz’s conducting style was a response to his whole musical aesthetic; as Heinrich Heine wrote in 1844:

In the one [Berlioz], striking effects of light and shadow, in the other [Briton] a fiery instrumentation; in the one a poor sense of melody, in the other a poor sense of colour; in both little beauty and no feeling. Their works are neither Classical nor Romantic, neither reminiscent of Greece or the Catholic Middle Ages. Rather, they signal something higher, the Assyrian-Babylonian-Egyptian age of architecture, and the massive passion that it expressed.57

Despite acknowledging the insufficiency of craftsmanship as the basis for the creation of a metaphysical art and their emphasis on the divine inspiration, Berlioz, like Wackenroder and Hoffmann, nevertheless cannot abandon the reason of the Enlightenment. They followed Kant in asserting that `a striving toward knowledge of the infinite, was a rational, and not merely irrational, striving,’58 with Wackenroder claiming that `this man [Leonardo da Vinci] is certainly elevated above other human beings’ because his `divine flash’ is accompanied by `the study of the secrets of the paintbrush’ and `the most industrious observation,’59 and Hoffmann stating:

A composer has truly penetrated the secrets of harmony only if he can use its power to affect the human heart. For him the numerical relationships that remain lifeless formulas for the pedant without genius become magical prescriptions from which he conjures forth an enchanted world.60

For Berlioz, the exact same thing is true of his conducting, and indeed, is the very reason that he wrote L’Art du chef d’orchestre:

The orchestral conductor should [...] possess – besides the especial talent of which we shall presently endeavour to explain the constituent qualities – other almost indefinable gifts, without which an invisible link cannot establish itself between him and those he directs; the faculty of transmitting to them his feeling is denied him, and thence power, empire, and guiding influence completely fail him. He is then no longer a conductor, a director, but a simple beater of the time – supposing he knows how to beat it, and divide it, regularly.61

Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, written in 1757, is a locus of gestural aesthetics, and provides a codified manual of specific rational events or concepts that lead to sublime irrational responses: essentially the same function as Berlioz’s L’Art du chef d’orchestre.62 Where Berlioz’s treatise is a manual of technical gestures to express music, Burke’s work is almost a catalogue for Romantic artists of aesthetic tropes ready to be used in pursuing the sublime. Burke locates the sublime in Nature, and then goes on to identify different experiences that lead to the sublime, the abandonment of rational awareness. It is very possible to locate these sublime aesthetics within Berlioz’s compositions, particularly Symphony Fantastique and Faust; invoking a frightful, ancient other-world of giants, monsters, and fated civilizations, Heinrich Heine casts Berlioz in a surreal world recalling the myths of Babylon and Nineveh:

Today [April 25, 1844] we shall begin with Berlioz, whose first concert served to open and inaugurate the musical season. Works not exactly new brought a fair reward of applause and even the slowest minds were carried away by the violence of the genius revealing itself in every creation of this great master. The beating of the wings in this music betray the presence of no ordinary singing bird; this is a colossal nightingale, a skylark of the size of an eagle such as existed in a primordial, lost world. Indeed, to me, Berlioz’s music in general has something primeval, if not straightforwardly antediluvian, about it, reminding me of animal species now extinct, of legendary kingdoms and sins, of piled-up impossibilities: of Babylon, of the hanging gardens of Semiramide, of Nineveh, of the wonders of Mizraim, such as we can see on the paintings of the Englishman [John] Martin. Indeed, if we look for an analogy in painting, then we see the elective affinity between Berlioz and this fantastic Briton: the same taste for the colossal and monstrous, for the gigantic, for material immeasurableness. In the one, striking effects of light and shadow, in the other a fiery instrumentation; in the one a poor sense of melody, in the other a poor sense of colour; in both little beauty and no feeling. Their works are neither Classical nor Romantic, neither reminiscent of Greece or the Catholic Middle Ages. Rather, they signal something higher, the Assyrian-Babylonian-Egyptian age of architecture, and the massive passion that it expressed.63



Figure

Figure 3: By Cham, published in Charivari, 25 November 1855. The caption reads: `What should have been the composition of the orchestra conducted by M. Berlioz in the hall of the Universal Exhibition.’


Similarly, the artist Cham published a sketch of his impression of Berlioz conducting his own works (figure 3) which clearly shows a collection of exotic, foreign characters playing a collection of weird and wonderful instruments, very reminiscent of Burke and Hiene. We find resonances of Burke in Berlioz – most striking is how close Burke comes to Hoffmann and Wackenroder in the distinction between `inspiration’ and rational control. Yet Burke goes on to outline the problems of communicating this this dichotomy or locating oneself within it. Burke writes `of the difference between clearness and obscurity with regard the passions’:

It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the imagination. If I make a drawing of a palace, or a temple, or a landscape, I present a very clear idea of those objects; but then [...] my picture can at most affect only as the palace, temple, or landscape would have affected in reality. On the other hand, the most lively and spirited verbal description I can give, raises a very obscure and imperfect idea of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger emotion by the description than I could do by the best painting [...] In reality a great clearness helps but little towards affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an enemy to enthusiasms whatsoever.64

If we accept Burke, then it is not surprising to find a great deal of obscurity in Berlioz’s conducting, particularly when compared to the clarity and formalism of the traditional French school of Habeneck; if every gesture is absolutely clear then there is little room for the imagination and enthusiasm. Yet, the challenge for Berlioz is more complex. By the time Berlioz was an established conductor there is absolutely no reason to believe he was ever intentionally unclear; rather, that his gestures were measured in such a way as to allow for the aesthetic of the possibility of obscurity, where Habeneck’s were not. One only needs to look at the great conductors of our day to see exactly this – where Habeneck may have beaten time throughout a piece, the modern conductor after Berlioz is allowed the freedom to clearly make unclear gestures. Players are not unsure as to the meaning of a gesture, but rather, are sure that the gesture is meant to be one of obscurity. Burke too hints at this difficulty of communicating the sublime and the unclear. He goes on to remark on a `poetical’ poem of Satan by Milton, that:

In what does this poetical picture contain? In images of a tower, an archangel, the sun rising through mists, or in an eclipse, the ruin of monarchs, and the revolutions of kingdoms. The mind is hurried out of itself by a crowd of great and confused images; which affect because they are crowded and confused. For separate them, and you lose much of the greatness, and join them, and you infallibly lose the clearness. The images raised by poetry are always of the obscure kind; though in general the effects raised by poetry are by no means to be attributed to the images it raises. [...] A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea. 65

So for Berlioz, the meaning raised by conducting is always of the obscure kind; though in general the effects raised by conducting are by no means to be attributed to the music it raises. Clear – uninspired – conducting is another name for poor conducting.

Gendering the Conductor Genius

Despite this rich history of French gestural aesthetics from Diderot and Condillac to l’Epée, there must be some reason for the French musical establishment to take fifty years longer than most other countries to properly move to baton conducting. Where Berlioz was touring the world very successfully, Habebeck remained in stolid control in France. The difficulty for the French lay in the social climate in the aftermath of the Revolutions: frequent political instability had resulted in a breakdown of the previously assumed power of patriarchal authority that led to an association of the Terrors with such a breakdown. Thus, French society began to drive binary divides through itself to try and maintain social hierarchies, divides based around constructions of race, class, and as Michel Foucault has described, a marginalisation of `them’ – the others, the criminals, the handicapped, the poor – from the rest of society.66 One of most powerful binary oppositions that came to be enforced was that of gender – whose post-Revolutionary construction, and particularly its relationship with physicality and gesture, does much to clarify our understanding of Berlioz’s mixed reception as a conductor. In the first half of the nineteenth century, gender ambiguity is dealt with in the medical and scientific discourses as a kind of `mania’: be it `melancholia’, `lypemania’, `demonomania’, or `erotomania’.67 Any fluidity of gendered meanings was to be purged from public and private spheres for the sake of preserving the sanctity of masculine power. The great paradox for Romantic artists was the very act of creativity itself – an activity seen as simultaneously masculine in its teleological `productivity’ and feminine in its `sensitivity’ and `seductiveness’. The composer thus sat on dangerous line between rational masculinity and an irrational, mad, feminine. As Elaine Showalter and Catherine Clément have shown, madness was often linked to an excess of feminine sexuality, usually designated as an array of forms of hysteria.68 These associations of gender ambiguity and mania were typically run through a discourse that medicalised the body, with the feminine as the perfect exemplar of `the bodily’. Indeed, before Le neveu de Rameau, Diderot had, in `Conversations on The Natural Son‘ (`Entretiens sur Le Fils naturel’), critically conceived enthusiasm as a pathological condition which `is born of some object in nature’, and which causes `a man [that] has been granted the gift of genius’ to become, in a fashion similar to accounts of Berlioz, `absorbed, agitated, tormented’.69As Showalter notes of Smithson:

The Romantics [...] were captivated by the spectacle of Ophelia’s sexuality and emotionality. Passionately portrayed by the Irish ingenue Harriet Smithson in Paris productions of the 1830s, Ophelia became an obsession for the century’s artists. In her mad scenes, Smithson wore a long black veil, suggestive of the symbolism of female sexual mystery that permeates the Gothic novel, and scattered Bedlamish straw in her hair.70

It is hardly surprising that Berlioz fell in love with this woman: she embodied much of his musical aesthetic. For early nineteenth-century French intellectuals the associations between the body, hysteria, gesture, and the feminine was a problematic that they only partly found a way around. Philosophers, like l’Epée and his study of gesture, rooted their work firmly in classical and Enlightenment thought; thus gesture could be kept firmly in the rational sphere, safe from the problematic feminine. By echoing the fears that Plato articulated two-thousand years earlier – that the acting out of emotions was a feminine act, dangerous and degrading for men – they put themselves in a paradox of the their own creating: a great deal of theorising on gesture was possible, without actually being put into practice. Indeed, as the next chapter will show, l’Epée’s work quickly moved from a system of polysemic gestures to a heavily formalised system of distinctly monosemic ones, a move that essentially drove out gender ambiguity from a physical activity.

Thus, the maintenance of the violin-bow conductor in the major musical establishments was a way of keeping potentially unsafe, feminising gestures, that were typified by Berlioz, out of the heart of French culture, preferring instead the masculine, ordered, clear direction of the violin-bow director.

Berlioz: Technical Magician

When Berlioz saw Smithson as Ophelia in Shakespeare’s Hamlet he fell completely in love with her.71 Yet, as has already been mentioned, Smithson spoke not a word of French nor could she sing. In short, she had no linguistic method of communicating with her audience. Berlioz, too, when in front of an orchestra, had no audible method of communicating. Yet both were incredibly successful in their vocations – Smithson taking Paris by storm and Berlioz becoming of the greatest conductors of the century. The key to both lies in a very formidable technique: Smithson was highly trained and an extremely capable mimetic actress, and Berlioz, quite literally, wrote the book on modern conducting technique.



Figure

Figure 4: This cartoon was published in Louis Reybaud, Jérôme Paturot à la recherce d’une position sociale (Paris, 1846). The caption reads: `Heureusement la salle est solide… elle résiste!‘ [Fortunately the hall is solid... it can stand the strain!].


Berlioz developed a specific baton technique that had not existed in Paris previously – one suited to the communication of the genius and the sublime. Habeneck had essentially conducted solely with a violin bow, and indeed, often conducted from the first violin part to save having to turn so many pages.72 As mentioned earlier, it was almost paradoxical that whilst Paris was one of the most avant-gardé musical centers in Europe, in its conducting traditions it stayed quite conservative. Whilst accounts of Habeneck and even his students, Gerard, Hainl, Tilmant et al., display an accomplished technique, they pale in comparison to the accounts of Berlioz’s almost wizardry and magical technique with a baton. Compare, for example, figures 4 and 5: one showing Habeneck conducting with a violin bow from the first violin part, the other the suave Berlioz with his armies of musicians.



Figure

Figure 5: François-Antoine Habeneck conducting. Drawing by Chalot after a bas-relief by Dantan the Younger. In Adolphe Jullien, Paris dilettante, etc. (Paris, 1884).


Naturally, the place to start an analysis of Berlioz’s conducting technique is his treatise, L’Art du chef d’orchestre. This twelve-page study was the first to consider the conductor as a specialist, distinct from a time-beating composer or a violin-bow leader. The manual was incredibly thorough and detailed in its discussion of conducting technique, as well as containing valuable commentary on the roles and responsibilities of a conductor. The treatise proved immediately popular, and was soon translated into German, English and Italian.73

Through his treatise Berlioz became the first French conductor to acknowledge that there even was such thing as a technique, remarking that it was `as specialised as the violinist’s. It is acquired only by long practice, and only if one has a very marked natural aptitude for it.’74 More specifically, what Berlioz recognised was not a technique for time-beating, for such a thing had existed for several centuries (resonating back to Lully) but a technique for expressive baton conducting. Although baton conducting took two or three decades longer to gain hold in Paris than it did elsewhere in Europe, many people remarked on the effectiveness of Berlioz’s baton style. Ryan remembered that `his beating was emphatic and intelligible, and the mass of instrumentalists followed the slightest indication of his baton, the minutest shade of expression which he desired to obtain, with marvellous accuracy’; Rimsky-Korsakov reported from Russia that `Berlioz’s beat was simple, clear, beautiful. No vagaries at all in shading’; and, César Cui described Berlioz thus, `from a plastic point of view, what simplicity in his pose, what a sobriety, and at the same time what precision of gesture!’75 For Smithson as much as Berlioz, however, the beauty of technique lies in its transparency, its subservience to a greater artistic aim; and, that this shift in emphasis from technical orientated to expression orientated was symptomatic of the change between the violin-bow direction in the Ancient Regieme and the modern French conductor.

Despite this emphasis on technique, Berlioz’s conducting stands apart from every other contemporary musical development in its inaudibility. Violinists, pianists, singers all create in sound: conductors create in silence. Whilst there are a great many metaphorical similarities between conducting and other instruments – the baton is like a violin bow, the breath like that of a wind player, the eye contact that of a singer – they are sonically fundamentally different. For Berlioz nearly all his musical performance and practice was silent, for composition too is both essentially a silent and non-performatitive act. His almost complete lack of training within the French musical establishment left him an outsider, largely until he won the Prix de Rome, and even then he had a great many skeptics within the institutions. Yet, this lack of training is what forced him to develop his new style. He could not have been a violin-bow director had he even wanted for he could not play the violin. He never played the piano, so lacked any association with the elite musicians, and he never had a great desire to conduct the works of others. It is not surprising to find a musician like Berlioz being the first to greatly develop a thorough and expressive gestural technique – apart from composition, conducting was the only musical activity he was any good at. Thus, to try and trace his development as a conductor from the French school of violin-bow direction is somewhat futile; certainly, it may have been partly a reaction against the tradition, but there is much more fertile discovery to be made elsewhere within the work of l’Epée and Sicard.

First, the purpose of Berlioz’s treatise and those of l’Epée and Sicard are remarkably similar, even if approaching different gestural topics. Both begin with the logical and philosophical separation of technique and meaning, the sign and the signifier. Berlioz does so by initially arguing that technique is only the vehicle by which artistic expression can be achieved, yet without which nothing would be possible, and that therefore a gestural system that is universally understood is needed, and indeed, is thus the most basic prerequisite for a successful conductor. By making the distinction between abstract technique and musical meaning he is able to separate the two and focus almost exclusively on the former in his treatise, but with the tacet assumption that technique is not in and of itself. l’Epée made a near identical move at the start of his work, if more philosophical. He challenged the philosophies of Diderot and Condillac that had traced gesture to an earlier stage in the evolution of language: for Diderot and Condillac communication began with the idea, developed into the gesture, and became articulated by the word.

Thus, communication by gesture was essentially a primitive act, a step back for human development. Hence, the purpose of l’Epée’s work was to create a system of signs which would bridge the void between gesture and language – a way of speaking to the eyes rather than the ears. For Condillac it was only through language that man could develop intelligence and memory, and thus the deaf were classified as dumb; for l’Epée the separation of gesture from language allowed him to develop a system of gestures that replicated language, and thus elevated the deaf from the status of the dumb.76 He, in the exact same logical step as Berlioz, was thus able to create a dictionary of gestures that had abstract meanings, which would then be employed with a system of supplementary logic to create language. Where Berlioz had gestures for beating two or three or four beats in a bar irrespective of the musical content of the bars, l’Epée had gestures for the letter `a’, a woman, or greatness, say. Yet a divergence occurs in the systems of supplementary logic that each employ: l’Epée’s system of gestures are to be superimposed with a grammatical system of spoken and written language – verbs, tenses, agreements and so on; Berlioz’s, however, are to be superimposed with the ambiguous and semiotically fluid language of music. Where l’Epée constructs logical meaning from his system of gestures, Berlioz destructs logical meaning by putting it to the service of music. l’Epée takes logic and develops it, Berlioz starts with logic and uses it to express the irrational. Yet, in both cases, they must first establish a system of universally understood gestures.



Figure

Figure 6: Berlioz’s indication for the beating of two and three beats in a bar.


Thus, second, the way Berlioz and l’Epée present their gestural systems are intensely systematised and hierarchal: they begin by presenting a very basic category of gestures, upon which more developed gestures are built. These in turn are coupled to create further more complex gestural categories. For Berlioz this pedagogical method begins with gestures for beating two and three beats in a bar (figure 6) and then systematically combining them to create four, five, six and seven beats in a bar (figure 7). l’Epée used a similar system of hierarchal gestures: his course moved rapidly from an introduction, to general principles of naming, to complex grammatical formulae.77 Figure 8 shows part of the manual alphabet he introduces early on in his guide, which later gets combined with grammatical constructions to mimic language.



Figure

Figure 7: Berlioz’s indication for the beating of five and seven beats in a bar, combining methods for beating two and three beats.




Figure

Figure 8: The manual alphabet devised by Bonet and adapted by l’Epée. From J. P. Bonet, Reducción de las Lettras y Arte para Enseñar à Ablar los Mudos (Madrid, 1620).


Despite the prominence of gestural aesthetics within early nineteenth-century French thought and indeed the rhetorical similarities between Berlioz’s l’Art du chef d’orchestre and the works of Sicard and l’Epée, they were not by any means devoid of Revolutionary politics. Amongst the various philosophical ideals of Romantic France was a belief in a hierarchical and ordered society, an order that found its strength in maintaining bi-polarities. As l’Epeé’s work was primarily focused on the education of the handicapped, the `others’ mentioned earlier, it was accepted in principal but not so much in practice; deafness was still seen as a pathological condition that put the deaf in a lower strata of society. Thus, the need for a gestural language or method of communicating, whilst seen as often necessary, was always seen as a substitute for spoken communication.78 Similarly too, I argue, the French musical establishments, in an equivalent strive to maintain masculine order and hierarchy in politically uncertain times, continued to favour the old-fashioned violin-bow direction to the new baton conductor, long after many other countries had gone a long way in changing.

This desire for stability also manifest itself in a strong disapproval of ambiguity, be it ambiguity in status, gender, politics, meaning and so on. l’Epée’s system was full of polymeaning signs, making it a blessing for Romantic art and a curse for a political society: l’Epée described how the same sign – a cupping of the right hand at the hairline – stood for hairstyle, the feminine gender, and woman. The sign was thus always contingent: metaphorical or metonymic, depending on context, but always polysemic – and gendered, precisely like the style of conducting Berlioz advocated, and precisely the reason the musical institution did not want to adopt it. As Nicholas Mirzoeff argues, gesture and sign came to be understood as both feminine and philosophical, and this posed a challenge to French society.79

Deafness and the need to communicate by sign was seen as pathological on what Foucault termed the `medical bipolarity of the normal and the pathological.’80 This pathologicalisation of deafness that occurred in the early nineteenth century re-posited it as a physical disease instead of a mental condition, and thus brought it inline with a wider collection of conditions that were being re-examined in a physical rather than mental light. This new `medicine of the imagination’, as Francesca Brittan describes, included monomania as seen earlier, and also many typically `gestural’ conditions such as epilepsy, hysteria, convulsions, and tetanus.81 Hence, the use of sign-language, or in Berlioz’s case expressive gesture, became part of this problematic femininised `other’. Indeed, Brittan has argued that much of Berlioz’s life and composition was inexorably linked to the expanding definition of medicine to `include study of both le moral and le physique‘ – his idée fixes were a function of an particular form of `erotomania’, itself a feminine codified condition, focused around the blurred distinction Berlioz held for Smithson, Ophélie, and Shakespeare.82

Thus, somewhat paradoxically, by the 1830s, the advancement of sign-language had moved away from a search for a fluid, polysemic universal language to a culturally and politically `safe’ formalisation of sign-language as a semantic substitution for spoken language. The `otherness’ of sign-language, its ambiguity and links to an original language, were rendered safe; Sicard’s work, for example, provided a gesture to mean `great’ and then a selection of following gestures to alter its syntactic or grammatical function to `greatness’, or `greater’, and so on. A gesture had one particular meaning, which by virtue of being closely related to normal speech became only a step away from the most exalted human characteristic after free will: spoken language. Berlioz’s move to baton conducting represented the exact opposite shift: from a system of highly formalised, safe, musical direction to a complex aesthetic of gestural semiotics, where meanings lay in the imagination. Yet both were bound together by the formalisation of technique – at no point does Berlioz advocate the denial or abandonment of learned gestures. Where the success of l’Epée and Sicard lay in their progressively more clear technical system, Berlioz’s lay in the possibility of ambiguity and fluidity between meanings.

The Genius and The Orchestra

Vladimir Stasov (1824-1906), one of the greatest Russian music critics, wrote on Berlioz’s first visit to Russia in 1847:

What the piano is to Liszt, the orchestra is to Berlioz. Just as Liszt knows all the innermost secrets of the piano, so Berlioz knows the orchestra. He compels it to venture upon new paths, to produce sounds such as have never been heard before. He forces it to bow before his baton and play in such a way as no one has ever been able to play before… Probably no one else has ever delved so deeply into the art of musical performance as he has; no one else has ever experienced the joy he does when `playing the orchestra’ (as he himself puts it). His amazing ear catches every nuance even the most elusive. He never permits a single one to slip by; he brings each one out through the thunder of the entire orchestra. Under Berlioz’s direction the orchestra is like a steed that feels the full power of its rider. Leading it, Berlioz is a veritable general, adored by all his forces, inspiring them by some kind of extraordinary power to accomplish unprecedented feats. Under him, they do things it would have seemed no one on earth could have made them do. It is as though the musicians seated before him were not men but a row of keys; he plays them with his ten fingers, and each one produces just the sound, just the degree of tone that is needed.83

This report by Stasov is characteristic of Berlioz’s inspirational practice in front of an orchestra. His ability to play upon the orchestra, drawing out lines of sound, bringing together disparate musicians into a single unified orchestra, and taking it to new worlds of colour and sound. Most telling is its conflation of the orchestra with the piano, Berlioz with Liszt.

Indeed, it is in Liszt that Berlioz finds a way out of the problematic gender web created by his conducting. This web is not an easy one to untangle, and neither Berlioz nor the French establishments seem to have been able to: Berlioz because he had no need to, and the establishment because it could not see how to. In collapsing the space between the composer and the performer Berlioz unwittingly broke down the gender safety-nets that Habeneck could enjoy. Composition itself, as previously mentioned, had something of an ambiguous gender coding; the fantastic trope that defined much of Berlioz’s work was certainly feminine, with its links to hysteria and madness; the act of conducting, previously thought safely masculine became feminised by Berlioz’s introduction of expressive gestures. Then, in conducting his own works, Berlioz removed the separation of feminine creator and masculine interpreter, becoming both simultaneously – blurring the line where artistic creation stops and damaging the fence that protected others from its feminine contagiousness.

A way out for Berlioz is found in Liszt. As Reeve argues, the two people who greatly influenced Berlioz’s early responses to music were women: Harriet Smithson and Camille Moke (later Marie Pleyel). Berlioz’s love of these women was deeply entangled in his responses to their (feminine) music making and performance gestures.84 The question that Reeve posits with regard to Berlioz’s opinions of others is equally applicable to Berlioz himself when conducting: `The pattern that emerges from these events is hardly encouraging for performers, least of all women. A performer appears to have two choices: she can be sincere, assuming and submitting to the emotions she embodies – in which case she risks her sanity and even her life; or she can “fake it,” in which case she is a calculating manipulator and a “prostitute” – and therefore deserves to die. By this logic, she is caught in a double bind that fulfills all of Plato’s worst fears and leaves us wondering: is there a way out?’85



Figure

Figure 9: The electric baton, by Cham in Charivari (2 December 1855). The caption reads: `M. Berlioz takes advantage of his electric baton to direct an orchestra which will have its members in every part of the world.’


Diderot comes to Berlioz’s rescue: Berlioz came to realise that to make him weep, you must not weep yourself. Berlioz, although engaging in the feminine act of expressive gesture and artistic creation, can explicate himself by not demonstrating his responses to his own music in front of the orchestra. Rather, he came to learn to control his emotions in order to produce better effect from his orchestra. Indeed, it was in Liszt that Berlioz saw the perfect model for this balance of artistic expression. Berlioz sees Liszt as a man who has conquered himself. As Reeve argues, in Berlioz’s eye’s, in short, Moke shows emotion but does not feel it, which makes her both frivolous and false; Liszt feels emotion but doesn’t show it, which makes him noble, spiritual, manly, in control: a “new Oedipus.” Thus Berlioz is in part able to escape the gender ambiguity when on the podium: he has the self mastery of his technique to inspire others without `showing’ himself, and to `feel’ himself without being inexorably linked to showing.

Stasov’s metaphor of the Berlioz treating the orchestra like a keyboard is not uncommon. Berlioz’s formalisation of technique as described in his L’art du chef d’orchestre is an articulation of a wider Romantic trend that eulogised technique itself as a vehicle for reaching some kind of transcendence or spiritual meaning. Whilst Berlioz himself would almost certainly have not subscribed to this position, it is impossible to ignore his treatise within this trend, and the effect it had upon subsequent conductors. Two of Berlioz’s great admirers, Liszt and Schumann, were both exceptional pianists and both used various `practice aids’, dactylions, the chirogymnaste and so on, to further their technique – Schumann so much so that he cut the webbing in his hands and could no longer play. Paganini too was renowned for his divine transcendental technique, a technique so advanced that it began to broach upon the `content’ of a musical performance rather than just being the `form’ that enabled it.86 Berlioz himself proposed a system of electric wires that would have `Five assistant conductors receive my tempo by electric wires, communicating it at once to the groups under their direction’ as shown in figure 9.87 This virtuosity of technique was Parisian almost by conception; as Gautier claimed, Paris was the city `which puts the seal on all reputations and definitely places the golden crown on the heads of young prodigies’.88 As Samson has argued, it was reconfiguration of the public spaces in France in the early nineteenth century that opened the doors to the Romantic virtuoso, `for which the piano would prove to be the ideal medium.’89 Thus accounts that link Berlioz’s virtuosic conducting to the piano are hardly surprising – the piano was the quintessential vehicle for performative display, a mechanical machine conquered by human spirit.

In summary then, the technical and aesthetic developments that Berlioz brought to the art of conducting were great and striking in their breath and daring. He embodied the aesthetics of the fantastic, the grotesque, and the genius that had emerged in Romantic France through writers such as Diderot, Hoffmann, Burke et al., and indeed his own music, in a new expressive, inspired gestural language that stood as the antithesis of the style of musical direction favoured in the establishments. Berlioz coupled this aesthetic shift with a powerful and developed baton technique – a form of gestural precision that was resonant with French advances in sign-language and pantomime. Yet, for reasons of Revolutionary politics and constructions of gender and the artist, the key French establishments generally maintained the old style of violin-bow direction until 1867, despite Berlioz’s great success abroad. Finally, the resolution of the dichotomy between inspired gesture and a virtuosic technique that Berlioz achieved marked the beginning of our conceptions of the modern conductor.

Berlioz arrives in a city. He gathers together musicians of all kinds and calibres. He seldom has more than two or three rehearsals – sometimes, very rarely, four. Then suddenly this group is transformed into an orchestra; it becomes one man, one instrument, and plays as though all of its members were finished artists. Berlioz’s concerts end. He leaves. And everything is as it was before – each man for himself. The mighty spirit that had inspired everyone for a moment is gone.90

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Footnotes:

1Seidl was a protege of Richard Wagner and a distinguished conductor. Although too young to see Berlioz in action, he recorded the memories of Cosima Wagner, who was thirty-one when Berlioz died. Quoted in Michael Rose, Berlioz Remembered (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p. 129.

2The Le Carnaval Romain had in fact been performed before at a concert on 19 January 1845 at the Cirque Olympique. Although not the only time Hallé made inaccuracies in his reports, the work would have been new to most of the players, and still shows a remarkable tour de force by the conductor. Ibid., p. 132.

3For a full and interesting account of this evening, see Katherine Kolb Reeve, `Primal Scenes: Smithson, Pleyel, and Liszt in the Eyes of Berlioz’, 19th Century Music, vol. 18, no. 3 (Spring, 1995), pp. 211-23, 211; or, Peter Raby, Fair Ophelia: A Life of Harriet Smithson Berlioz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

4Hector Berlioz, Memoirs, trans. Ernest Newman and Eleanor Holmes (London: Dover, 1966), p. 464.

5Ibid., pp. 97-98, 95.

6Reeve, `Primal Scenes’.

7See, for example, James R. Knowlson. `The Idea of Gesture as a Universal Language in the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 26, no. 4, (1965) pp. 495-508. Descartes and Leibniz had both devoted much time to the philosophical ideas of a universal language; Leibniz claimed that the idea of such a language had `a rational philosophy as clear and unshakeable as arithmetic.’ G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Arien and Daniel Graber (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1989), p. 8. See J. Cohen, `On the Project of a Universal Character’ in Mind LXIII (1954), pp. 49-63, for a history of the idea of a universal language. This interdisciplinary interest that focused on the body is also apparent in other fields, for example, in philosophy much was made of the Descartian associations between the state of the mind and the effect upon one’s health. See Steven Shapin, `Descartes the Doctor: Rationalism and Its Therapies’, The British Journal for the History of Science, vol. 33, no. 2 (June, 2000), pp. 131-154.

8This emerging discipline was part of a larger intellectual exercise underway in post-Revolutionary France that saw a wide range of Enlightenment philosophies under criticism – an integral part of which was a conscious examination of the ideas of genius and creativity; as Mary Hurst Schubert suggests, `the very act of artistic creativity was a topic of extensive investigation.’ Wackenroder’s Confessions and Fantasies, ed. Mary Hurst Schubert (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), p. 45. Indeed, Berlioz himself wrote a great deal on the topic in his many writings as a musical critic.

9Hector Berlioz, A Travers chants, ed. Leon Guichard (Paris, 1971), p. 26.

10Charles Hallé, Life and Letters of Sir Charles Hallé, ed. C. E. Hallé and Marie Hallé (London: Smith, 1896), p. 65, and Richard Wagner, My Life (London: Constable, 1911), p. 234. Wagner was also, however, a bad pianist, but whenever teased about it would retort that at least he was better then Berlioz.

11For a summary of Berlioz’s developments in conducting, see the relevant chapters in Elliott Galkin, The History of Orchestral Conducting: Theory and Practice (New York: Pendragon Press, 1988). Galkin and most other conducting scholars attribute the beginning of the aesthetic of the modern baton conductor to Berlioz and his contemporaries.

12See, for example, the many excellent articles in Berlioz Studies, ed. Peter Bloom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). None give particular reference to Berlioz as a conductor beyond the historical facts.

13François Henri Joseph Castil-Blazé, De l’Opéra en France (Paris: Janet et Cotelle, 1820).

14Felix Mendelssohn became the first baton conductor of the Gewandhaus in 1835; Louis Spohr, according to legend, introduced the baton in 1820 at a concert with the Philharmonic Society in London; Liszt used a baton when he began conducting 1848. See The Cambridge Companion to Conducting, ed. José Antonio Bowen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 93-114.

15Galkin, The History of Orchestral Conducting, p. 442.

16Habeneck was appointed Directeur General de la Musique of the Opéra National in 1821, and Chef d’orchestre of the Orchestre de la Societe des Concerts du Conservatoire which had been formed in 1828, the two most important musical posts in France. Berlioz’s writings are saturated with criticism of Habeneck both musically and for his stolid control over the Parisian musical scene; though, his accounts are at times tempered by some respect and admiration for the conductor. Habeneck, from 1824 until his death, was both violin professor and Inspecteur General of the Conservatoire National de Musique; indeed, he was an outstanding virtuoso violinist and in 1804 received a Premier Prix du Violin – a world apart from Berlioz’s musical training.

17See Berlioz, Memoirs, p. 410.

18Chorley wrote of Habeneck that `The minuet[... ] was taken too fast – and still not blithely enough; while the splendid subject in the trio lost all its dignity from the acceleration of time; and the second part of the same movement, all its voluptuous richness from being performed entirely without nuance.’ Galkin, The History of Orchestral Conducting, pp. 477-479.

19For example, the treatises of Saint-Lambért, Simpson, Quantz, Mozart et al. are all primarily concerned with time-beating patterns; questions of subdivision, deciding a tempo, the meanings of different time signatures, and so on. Michel de Saint Lambért, Les Principes de clavecin contenant une explication exacte de tout ce qui concerne la tablature et le clavier (Paris: C. Ballard, 1702); Christopher Simpson, A Practicall Symposium of Musicke (London: Brome, 1678); Johann Joachim Quantz, Versuch einer Anweisung die Flote traversiere zu spielen, ed. Hans Peter Schmitz (Kassel: Barenreiter, 1953); Leopold Mozart, A Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of Violin Playing, English edition, trans. Editha Knocker (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). Pragmatically too, direction of a performance was either from the keyboard or the principal violinist, using a roll of paper, a violin bow, a wooden scroll, or similar.

20Hector Berlioz, A Treatise on Modern Instrumentation and Orchestration to which is Appended the [sic] Chef d’Orchestre, trans. Mary Clarke (London and New York: Novello, Ewer, 1856), p. 257.

21Antoine Coypel, Discours prononcez dans les Conférences de l’Académie Royale de Peinture et Sculpture (Paris: Jacques Collombat, 1721), p. 167.

22Yet, even for the French in 1750 the idea of gesture as a universal language was nothing new. Lucian recounted, for example, in the dialogue Of Pantomime, how a Prince of Pontus, when promised a gift by Nero, requested that he should be granted the services of a well-known mime, who could replace the various ineffectual translators that he usually employed when talking with foreign dignitaries. The Works of Lucian of Samosata, trans. by H. W. and F. G. Fowler, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1905) At the turn of the seventeenth century, Giovanni Bonifacio, in l’Arte de’ Cenni, showed the extremely wide range of ideas that could be expressed by the orator’s gestures alone. Giovanni Bonifacio, L’Arte de’ Cenni con la quale formandose favella visibile, si tratta della muta eloquenza, che non è altro che un facondo silentio (Vicenza, 1616) Indeed, it is from Renaissance rhetoric and and practices of oration that the late eighteenth-century French scholars and theorists inherited most of their understanding of gesture. Classical scholars, like Bonifacio and John Bulwar in England, wrote a great amount on the different and correct uses of different physical gestures. Bulwar even went as far as to posit gestural communication above spoken, claiming that gestures were more striking in effect and speedier in execution. John Bulwar, Chirologia: or the Naturall Language of the Hand. Composer of the Speaking Motions, and Discoursing Gestures thereof. Whereunto is added Chironomia: or the Art of Manuall Rhetoricke etc. (London, 1644). When Enlightenment scholars turned to Plato they found evidence of deaf people communicating by gesture: the Cratylus refers to those significant movements of the head, hand and body that were made by the dumb, and Saint Augustine in De Quantitate Anima spoke of a deaf person who would understand others and express himself by means of gestures. Quoted in Kenneth Hodgson, The Deaf and Their Problems. A Study in Special Education (London: Philosophical Library, 1953), pp. 72-73.

23Charles Abbé de l’Epée, Institution des Sourds et Muets, par la voie des signes méthodiques; Ouvrage qui contient le Projet d’une Langue Universelle, par l’entremise des Signes naturels, assujettis à une Méthode (Paris: Butard, 1774).

24Alongside Sicard, Jean Massieau (1772-1846) and Laurent Clerc (1785-1869) also made important contributions to the field – both were pupils of l’Epée.

25Richard Wagner, On Conducting (London: Dover Publications, 1989) p. 19.

26Reeve, `Primal Scenes’, pp. 211-23, 211.

27Quoted in Francesca Brittan, `Berlioz and the Pathological Fantastic: Melancholy, Monomania, and Romantic Autobiography’, 19th Century Music, XXIX/3, pp. 211-239, 216.

28Berlioz, A Treatise on Modern Instrumentation and Orchestration, p. 245.

29Hallé, Life and Letters, p. 65.

30Saint-Saëns, 1913. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 134.

31Diderot: Rameau’s Nephew, D’Alembert’s Dream, trans. Leonard Tancock (New York: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 96-108.

32Berlioz, Autobiography, 2 vols, trans. Mary Clarke (London: Macmillan, 1884), pp. 2-241.

33Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 130.

34Spontini in a letter to Berlioz, 20 November 1843. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 128.

35Reeve, `Primal Scenes’.

36Marguerite in the love scene from Berlioz’s Damnation of Faust, for example, sings “Dans mes yeux des pleurs… tout s’efface… je meurs” (Tears cloud my eyes… Everything goes blank … I’m dying”. Reeve, `Primal Scenes’.

37Correspondence générale, vol. I, ed. Pierre Citron (Paris, 1972), p. 83 (18 Feb. 1825).

38Quoted in Reeve, `Primal Scenes’, p. 214.

39Hiller, 1880. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 130.

40In 1833 he conducted at the Thèâtre-Italien, and he conducted three times at the Salle du Conservatoire in 1835-36. These concerts were the first major step up from his previous conducting at the Church of St. Eustache in 1827.

41Quoted in Reeve, `Primal Scenes’, p. 214

42Letter to Humbert Ferrand (27 June, 1863), Correspondence générale VI.

43Tancock, Diderot: Rameau’s Nephew, p. 194

44Hiller, 1880. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 130.

45Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment. trans. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), p. 174.

46Johann Gottfried Herder, `Extract From a Correspondence on Ossian and the Songs of Ancient Peoples’ (1773); trans. in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Winckelmann, Lessing, Hamann, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, ed. H. N. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 154-61.

47Ibid., pp. 139-50.

48Ibid., pp. 102-108.

49Ibid., p 309.

50German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: The Romantic Ironists and Goethe ed. Kathleen Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 1.

51Quoted in Abigail Chantler, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Aesthetics (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 19.

52Friedrich Zelter in a letter to Goethe, 21 June 1829. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 35.

53E. T. A. Hoffmann, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: Kreisleriana; The Poet and the Composer; Music Criticism ed. David Charlton trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 79-80, 135.

54For example, early in his career Berlioz collected and burnt much of his work: the Mass, Beverley, Estelle et Némorin, and the Oratorio – he did a similar thing mid-career by destroying the Resurrexit, the Scène héroïque, much of Les Francs-Juges, and more. He also made a suicide attempt, had frequent marital troubles, and was often borrowing large sums of money. D. Kern Holoman, Berlioz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 82, 150, 344.

55Chantler, E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Aesthetics, p. 21.

56Kant, Critique of Judgment, pp. 175, 177.

57Heinrich Heine 1844, Quoted in Catharina Wurth, `The Musically Sublime: Infinity, Indeterminacy, Irresolvability’ (Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 202.

58German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, ed. Wheeler, p. 2.

59Wackenroder’s Confessions and Fantasies, pp. 99, 101. Sigmund Freud would, some century later, evaluate both da Vinci and Hoffmann himself in a similar fashion; though, Freud approaches issues of split-personality from a psychological perspective, in both cases attributing elements of inspired genius to suppressed childhood memories. See Sigmund Freud, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood (New York: 1964) and P. G. Aaron and Robert G. Clouse `Freud’s Psychohistory of Leonardo da Vinci: A Matter of Being Right or Left’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 13 no. 1 (Summer, 1982), pp. 1-16.

60E. T. A. Hoffmann, Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, p. 304.

61Berlioz, A Treatise on Modern Instrumentation and Orchestration, p. 245.

62Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

63Quoted in Wurth, `The Musically Sublime: Infinity, Indeterminacy, Irresolvability’, p. 202. In his Treatise on Instrumentation Berlioz is, for that matter, quite instructive and explicit on how to achieve dramatic effects of the terrible through musical sounds. He suggests, for instance, the use of sponge ends when playing the kettledrum to `produce mysterious, darkly menacing sounds’ – and recommends it for the pianissimo kettledrum-passages in Beethoven’s C minor Symphony (Berlioz, A Treatise on Modern Instrumentation and Orchestration, p. 380). Alternatively, he points to the dramatic effect of bells in the orchestra, which in Meyerbeer’s Les Huguenots creates `that ominous sound which spreads awe and horror’ – and in Berlioz’s own `Songe d’un nuit de Sabbath’, together with the tubas and bassoons, invokes death and damnation in a typically sardonic way. Ibid., p. 385.

64Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry, pp. 55-56.

65Ibid., pp. 57, 58.

66See Robert Nye, Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 47.

67For a complete discussion see Sander Gilman, `Zur Physiognomie des Geisteskranken in Geshichte und Praxis, 1800-1900′, Sudhoffs Archiv, 62 (1978), pp. 201-34. The storming of the Bastille in 1789 had worked as a spark to a whole powder-keg of unstoppable disruptions in the political and private spaces. The governing system that took over from the old Ancien Régime looked uncertain and fragile, and indeed, changed several times over the course of the rein’s of Luis XVI, Emperor Napoleon, Louis Philippe and the July Monarchy. Napoleon’s fall and return during The Hundred Days `illustrated the instability of autocratic, patriarchal authority’. See `Romanticism Raises the Dead – Gautier’s La Morte amoureuse (1836)’, Amy Ransom, The Feminine as Fantastic in the Conte Fastastique: Visions of the Other (New York: Peter Lang, 1995). The result of these fifty years of political and social upheaval was frequently manifested in a hopeful clinging to conservatism, a return to Enlightenment rationalism, and a rejection of metaphysical theorisation – chiefly brought about by the Constitutional Monarchy that came to power in July 1830. For the arts, this political climate produced a great shift, in part, from a crisis in paternal, masculine authority that influenced the representation of the feminine as a fantastic threat to both social and individual stability.

68Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and Culture in England, 1830-1980 (New York, 1985), and Catherine Clément, Opera or the Undoing of Women, trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis, 1988).

69Denis Diderot, Selected Writings on Art and Literature, trans. Geoffrey Bremner (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 18

70Showalter, The Female Malady, p. 13.

71Or, as Reeve postulates, he fell in love with some amalgamation of Smithson, Ophelia, and Shakespeare. Reeve, `Primal Scenes’.

72The Cambridge Companion to Conducting, ed. Bowen, p. 139.

73To outline the precise technical developments Berlioz describes in his treatise is unnecessary; one only needs to read the treatise or the excellent chapter in Galkin’s The History of Orchestral Conducting to see the volumes of clearly described physical gestures a conductor must learn to make; suffice to say, it is definitely the first study of baton technique to go into this amount of detail.

74Hector Berlioz, Evenings in the Orchestra, trans. and ed. Jacques Barzun (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 324.

75F. G. Edwards, `Berlioz in England’, p. 444; quoted in Galkin, The History of Orchestral Conducting, p. 557. Nikolai Andreyevich Rimsky-Korsakov, My Musical Life, trans. Judah A. Joffe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), p. 75. Fouqué, Les Révolutionnaires de la musique, p. 253; quoted in Ibid., p. 557. Though, Berlioz’s technique was by no means infallible, as Rimsky-Korsakov noted when Berlioz was in his later years: `… at a rehearsal of his own piece Berlioz would lose himself and beat three instead of two or vice-versa. The orchestra tried not to look at him and kept on playing, and all would go well. Berlioz, the great conductor of his time, came to us when his faculties were already on the decline, owing to old-age, illness and fatigue. The public did not notice it, the orchestra forgave him. Conducting is a thing shrouded in mystery.’ Rimsky-Korsakov, My Musical Life, p. 75.

76Interestingly, by the early-nineteenth century the pathologicalisation of deafness had given rise to the beginnings of deaf cultural politics. A new deaf cultural elite looked to evade the stereotypes created by l’Epée by pretending to be semblables – `fellows’ of the hearing. They actually sought to mimic the ideas that preceded speech rather than speech itself. See `The Mimicry of Mimesis’ in Nicholas Mirzoeff, Silent Poetry: Deafness, Sign, and Visual Culture in Modern France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 90-139.

77Mirzeoff, Silent Poetry, p. 38.

78The education of the poor was one of the ways post-Revolutionary France wanted to break its cycle of poverty. Jean-Baptiste Jauffret, secretary of the Société des Observatuers de l’Homme founded in 1799 to advise the colonialist expeditions of Nicolas Baudin to Australia and Levaillant to Africa and employed by Sicard at the Institute, wrote that `speech is, after reason, the most beautiful prerogative of man … it is above all [speech] that distinguishes man from the crowd of animals which surrounds him.’ Quoted in Mirzeoff, Silent Poetry, p. 68.

79Nicholas Mirzoeff, `Body Talk: Deafness, Sign and Visual Language in the Ancien Régime’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 25, no. 4, Special Issue: Art History: New Voices/New Visions (Summer, 1992), pp. 561-585.

80See Robert Nye, Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 47.

81Brittan, `Berlioz and the Pathological Fantastic’.

82Brittan describes Berlioz’s initial relationship with Smithson thus: `Letters of this period seldom refer to Harriet by name; instead, Berlioz called her Ophélie, a reference to the Shakespearean guise in which he first encountered her. For Berlioz, who had never exchanged a word with Harriet, the tragic heroine of Hamlet was more immediate than the actress herself’. Brittan, `Berlioz and the Pathological Fantastic’, pp. 219-220, 216.

83Stasov, 1847. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 131.

84Berlioz recounts that he fell in love with both women at the moment when they were performing: Smithson on stage as Ophelia, and Moke playing Beethoven on the piano. The parallels between Smithson/Ophelia/Shakespeare and Moke/Beethoven are striking not only in situation but also in Berlioz’s response the the physicality of both occasions.

85Reeve, `Primal Scenes’, p. 226

86See Samson, Virtuosity and the Musical Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Samson argues that the display of virtuosity often became the meaning of performance itself.

87Berlioz, Memoires, p. 370.

88Gautier, The Romantic Ballet, trans. Cyril W. Beaumont (London, 1932, repr. New York 1980), p. 49.

89Samson, Virtuosity and the Musical Work, pp. 72-74, 72.

90Stasov, 1847. Quoted in Rose, Berlioz Remembered, p. 131.

Musical Crimes: Forgery, Deceit, and Socio-Hermeneutics

Thursday, March 19th, 2009

Abstract

Forgeries are the touchstone of musical criticism, stylistic analysis and aesthetic appreciation. Yet, are forgeries necessarily bad? This dissertation will investigate what a forgery can teach us about music and its relation to ourselves, in two connected sections.

The first will establish the distinctions between forgery in music and those in the other arts. The key themes and ideas will be explored: inventive versus imitative forgery, the cognitive stock and appearance theories, and what a musical forgery even is. Limitations of the current literature will be highlighted.

From this, the second section will propose a new approach to the musical forgery – one that takes account of the listener. It will use forgery as a gateway to exploring how we appreciate music, and how we are affected by a forgery. Hermeneutic and social theories will be incorporated to further investigate our relation to forgery, to musicology, and to music.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the tireless support of Dr. Benjamin Walton, Jesus College, University of Cambridge, in his supervision of this dissertation. I would also like to thank Dr. W. Dean Sutcliffe, University of Auckland, for his information on the Haydn Keyboard Sonatas.

`We lie loudest when we lie to ourselves’

Eric Hoffer, The Passionate State of the Mind, and Other Aphorisms1

`Every work of art is an uncommitted crime’

Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia2

Introduction

The Australian pianist and scholar Paul Badura-Skoda sits in the front row of the lecture hall, looking slightly disorientated. `My husband still thinks they’re genuine’, whispers his wife, Eva, a musicologist. She has just delivered her talk, `The Haydn Sonatas: A Clever Forgery’.3

In 1993, Badura-Skoda believed he had found the lost manuscripts of Joseph Haydn’s Keyboard Sonatas Nos. 21 to 28. These sonatas were hailed as the musical find of the century. The January issue of BBC Music Magazine published a statement by H. C. Robbins Landon, the acclaimed Haydn scholar, certifying the sonatas as authentic.4 Less than a month later, the same magazine issued a retraction. Upon closer examination the handwriting appeared to date from the twentieth-century. The engraving had probably been done with a steel-nibbed pen, something that only came into use in the nineteenth-century. The staves were peculiar, and so on. Landon’s Haydn sonatas became, in his own words, `a rather sinister forgery’.5

The whole drama was tantalising from the outset. The opening bars of each sonata already existed in a thematic catalogue. A little old lady who `couldn’t be disturbed’ had `discovered’ the completed versions of the sonatas in her home. She in turn passed them to a relatively unknown flautist, Winfried Michel.6 Michel became the only link between the source of the documents and the Haydn scholar, Robbins Landon.

Without doubt, Landon and Badura-Skoda had claimed the sonatas to be authentic long before any process of verification had been possible. But this is, of course, understandable. Music is a typically canonic discipline – changes or alterations to the core repertory happen rarely, and often take decades. It is not surprising that there is an excitement and intellectual fever brought about by a new discovery.

Yet the most delightful aspect of the whole debacle was still to come. Once suspicion was aroused, no other musician or scholar was willing to say for sure whether, based purely on an examination of the score, the Sonatas were by Haydn.7 Musicology prides itself on being able to distinguish great composers from their more `mediocre’ contemporaries, for example, with Mozart and Salieri.8 With the newly discovered Haydn works, no one would, or could, take a stand and provide proof as to the composer.9 Once proved to be forgeries, the Sonatas vanished from the public domain.

The Musical Forgery

History, and Its Difficulties

Forgeries are the illegitimate children of music and a commodity driven society, banished by musicology to the provinces. To give some examples: Mozart’s `Adelaide’ Violin Concerto turned out to be by Marius Casadesus, as did Handel’s Viola Concerto and Bach’s Cello Concerto. Valentin Strobel’s Concerto was shown to be by Fétis. The works for lute by Sautscheck and Ioannes Leopolita were later proved to be by Roman Turovsky-Savchuk; the works for baroque guitar by Antonio da Costa were actually by Paulo Galvao. `Kanzona’ for lute by Francesco Da Milano was really by Vladimir Vavilov, as was Sychra’s `Elegy’ for guitar. Not to mention all the works by Fritz Kreisler attributed to other composers.10 Forgeries, from the strictest cases to plagiarism and misattribution, have plagued the arts for over 2000 years.11 The pejorative nature of the term `forgery’ that we understand today is, however, a modern, post-nineteenth-century concern that grew out of the increasing status of the individual artist and composer. During the Renaissance, many painters took on apprentices who studied painting techniques by copying the works and styles of the master. As payment for the training, the master would then sell these works. Today, these works are made or broken by whether they were produced by the master or the apprentice respectively; yet, during the Renaissance they were not considered `forgeries’ in the negative sense, but `tributes’ to the master.

Over the course of the following centuries, the well-documented rise of the middle classes, alongside the emancipation of the individual artist, coupled with the increasing importance of authorship-over-content and historicist movements, led to demands for greater quantities of fine art. This demand repositioned art, with music included, as a cultural commodity, which began attaching previously unheard-of monetary value to artworks by particular, identifiable artists.12 In Sotheby’s Auction House in London earlier this year, the top price paid was £8.75m for Chaim Soutine’s 1921 painting `L’Homme au Foulard Rouge‘. Thirty lots made over £1m, with five records for individual artists being broken.13 Art is a billion dollar industry, entirely legal and at the same time largely unregulated. As a result, experts can only guess at the number of forgeries that are bought and sold. Indeed, a former director of New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art claimed that up to 40 percent of the market might be forgeries.14 It is a business that relies on trust. The possibility of monetary gain (or, perhaps more commonly, status) from art naturally resulted in the pejorative meaning of the term `forgery’ in use today: forgery is no longer a tribute, but deception for personal benefit.

Forgeries are also historically chameleonic, and this presents difficulties. A forgery undergoes several ontological transformations during its lifetime. It begins like any other work of art, entirely unsuspected. It then enters a transition phase, during which suspicion is aroused and its nature is largely unknown. Finally, it either returns to its original state, having been shown not to be a forgery, or, it must be reborn as a new work of art, forever branded as a forgery.

This dissertation will take the term `forgery’ from the modern standpoint, which is not necessarily the manner in which the forgeries were originally created. This is for two reasons. First, a frame of reference must be taken from somewhere, and, as this dissertation is concerned with our (modern) relationships to musical forgeries, a modern standpoint is natural. Second, forgeries themselves present chronological complexities: with a `genuine’ work there is `the work’, its reception history, and our relationship to it. With a forgery, there is also `the work’, and its reception history, and furthermore, a later forgery with its own reception history, the relationship between the forgery and the original, and our relationship to all three.

The Literature

The last half-century has seen a great volume of literature on the subject of art forgeries. The term ‘forgery’ has, however, continually eluded definition and categorisation. Whilst there are common grounds between authors on the subject, there is also a great deal of disparity. Indeed, some forty years after Lessing’s famous article, `What is Wrong with a Forgery’,15 Kirk Pillow, Joseph Margolis and Denis Dutton are still debating the very definition and scope of the term `forgery’.16 The concern for all these authors is ontology: it proves extremely hazardous to specify exactly what a forgery is. Even when common grounds are found, it is still a challenge to explain why we find works labelled as `a forgery’ unpleasant to begin with.17 This dissertation does not aim to explicitly continue the wider debate on the ontology of forgeries, but instead to focus the debate on music. This is not to isolate music without reference to the wider discussions, but to attempt to rectify a flaw in the current literature. Generally, all writings to date either explicitly or implicitly aim for a grand, unified theory of forgery, applicable to all art forms from all periods. They all, especially the earlier writers, try to find something intrinsic within the concept of forgery per se that transcends the ontology of the particular art form it forges.18 All a subsequent scholar has to do to prove a theory false is take a counter example from a particular, rather than general, art form. An aesthetic claim that may hold true for a forgery of painting may be completely incorrect within the context of dance, for example.

Therefore, a move is needed within the discussion of forgeries: a grand theory is naïve at best, and impossible at worst. For any progress to be made it is vital to acknowledge and celebrate the differences between the arts, rather than attempt to smooth them over by forcing them into a unified aesthetic classification. This is not, however, to divorce music from its relationships with other forms of art. There are certain places of contact between all forgeries, regardless of the form of artwork they are forging. Therefore, this dissertation will initially examine these similarities, before departing into a consideration of music.

What is a Forgery?

There is one question underlying all discussion of forgeries: why do people prefer a genuine work to a copy, even if they cannot tell the difference between the two? There must be something inherent within the label of `forgery’ that allows us to justify preferring the original.19

The answer to this question generally takes either of two forms: answers that focus upon our methods of aesthetic evaluation; or, answers that focus upon our cultural or moral conditioning. The former argues that if we cannot perceive an aesthetic difference between the two works, then we have no grounds for discriminating against the forgery. The latter would counter that it is our moral and social conditioning, not aesthetics, that makes forgeries so unpalatable – we are being deceived about the biography of the work, which is a set of properties we are unable to divorce from our overall appreciation of the work in question. These two approaches form the core of the formalist Appearance Theory and the contextualist Cognitive Stock Theory respectively.20

In 1976, Goodman published Languages of Art, in which he argues a position that adopts elements from both the contextualist and formalist approaches to forgery.21 From the contextualist perspective he takes on the case for originality as a fundamental component of aesthetic perception – simply knowing that a piece of music or painting is by a great artist is enough to distinguish it from an exact copy, even if we are not able to perceive the visual difference at present.22 On the other hand, he sides with the formalists by arguing that even if we cannot distinguish between the original and the forgery, the knowledge that we may be able to do so at a later date is enough to condition our aesthetic response today. Arthur Danto, however, challenged Goodman’s claims with his `Gallery of Indiscernibles’.23 Danto asks us to imagine a series of identical plain canvas squares painted in red: one is a `clever part of a Moscow landscape called Red Square‘, one is the work of a minimalist artist, and one is just a paint sample being used by the decorators. There is clearly no way to discern one from the other; yet, we still have a different aesthetic response to each. The same situation can be fashioned in music. Imagine a minor sixth: it is at once the opening to Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, two notes chosen arbitrarily by a student of composition, and the sound the air-conditioning happens to be making. Our response to each artwork is, then, conditioned by the external knowledge we bring to the artwork. It is because of this that forgeries are so unpalatable: the label of `forgery’, of deceit, is not a property we can separate from an artwork.24

Goodman and others acknowledged a characteristic that define all forgeries. What makes something a forgery and another a copy, or something a plagiarism and another a pastiche, is the intention by the forger to deceive the audience and withhold the truth surrounding the work’s biography. This separates out simple factual inaccuracy, mistaken identity or a known copy. People will happily buy a copy of a famous painting from the museum shop because they know that what they are buying is not claiming to be the original. As Denis Dutton describes, `Fraudulent intention, either by the artist or by a subsequent owner, is necessary for a work to be a forgery; this distinguishes forgeries from honest copies and merely mistaken attributions. But while unintentional forgery is impossible (I cannot simply out of mistake sign a painting I have just finished with “Rembrandt”), it is possible to unintentionally plagiarise.[...] I might remember and carry over into my work elements I have experienced in works by other people’25

Goodman also acknowledged the differences between what he termed `autographic’ and `allographic’ art forms.26 Autographic arts are those that place `the genuine’ in the physical artwork. The physical object counts as the `work’: a forgery is thus an indistinguishable copy of this object. By contrast, allographic arts, such as music, are defined not by a physical entity, but by the expression of an idea, or the `sameness of spelling’ of that idea. If I copy a Haydn keyboard sonata note for note, but with different handwriting and on a modern sheet of paper, and then passed it off as my own, it would count as a forgery, even though the physical object bore no resemblance to the original. The change in medium is immaterial, it would be an exact replication of the idea – I had presented the right notes in the right order. The autographic/allographic distinction led Goodman to claim that music was not forgeable, as exact duplication of the score did not constitute forgery. His claim has been re-examined in recent years: Jerrold Levinson pointed out that even if one does not forge the order of notes – the `spelling’ of a piece – a forger can still fake the biographical parameters of the work, which would therefore constitute a forgery.27

There is another way to approach the autographic/allographic distinction: imitative and inventive types of forgery. An imitative forgery copies or imitates an existing work, usually attempting at exact replication. When Goodman claimed that forgery was impossible in music, he was thinking solely of imitative forgery: an exact duplication of a Haydn score is still by Haydn, it is just being represented in a different medium. An inventive forgery is a new artwork that is claimed to be by someone other than its actual author or composer. This is more common in music, and is the possibility that Goodman did not account for.28 The missing Haydn sonatas are the perfect example: here, no existing work is being reproduced, but rather, a new work is created that is then claimed to be by Haydn. This again relies on the audience: the audience will only accept the new work as being by Haydn on one of two conditions. Either, they must know nothing about Haydn and his style, and so have nothing to compare the new work to. Or, the audience would need to know enough of Haydn’s musical language to be able to detect the similarities between the forgery and the style it invents within, as is the case with Robbins Landon.

Finally, a clarification is needed. It is straightforward when talking about forgeries to combine the forger with the forgery at the ontological level. Both scholars and audiences at least subconsciously recognise the link between the two, but often do not critically examine the relationship. As Francis Sparshott argues, a forgery, or indeed a genuine piece of music, makes no claims of originality or authorship.29 Any truth claims are made by the forger or owner: it is they who are doing the deceiving and misleading, not the music itself.

The Complexities of a Musical Forgery

Having seen the essential characteristics and definitions of a forgery, let us explore how they relate to music, and the complications that music brings with it. First, music adds complexities to Goodman’s autographic/allographic distinction. Take improvisation – is this a type of forgery? Or can it be forged? Whilst there may be a defining idea behind a piece set by the composer, the idea may not be fully expressed as an `exact spelling’. In jazz, there will usually be space for the performers to improvise on the ideas or spelling. In such a situation it is hard to define whom the `author’ of the work or performance is. If the performer were to claim that the piece was by him and not by the original composer, it is problematic to untangle the ontological mess to establish authorship.30 Similarly, it is hard to decide how far improvisation goes before the work would no longer count as allographic (being true to the correct spelling) and become autographic (a unique performance event). Furthermore, if the performer were to claim the work as his, he would surely be correct: his performance is distinct from all others, and he is not attempting to duplicate or forge the original.

Music also complicates the fine-art world’s preference for originality. Many composers frequently produced a multitude of versions of a particular work. For example, Schumann’s Fourth Symphony was originally composed in 1841, and subsequently re-orchestrated in 1851.31 In painting, corrections or revisions do not produce a new artwork as they do in music; they replace the existing one. Consider composers’ self-borrowings: Mary Ann Smart provided ample example of cases in nineteenth-century opera when it was conventional to reuse your existing material in later works.32 Studies of Bellini’s operas have shown that nearly half his uvre is derived or lifted from existing works by the composer – Bellini is in effect forging himself. The difficulty for audiences, as Smart notes, was that this practice undermined their belief in the artistic genius: the artist who receives some divine inspiration and composes in a flourish of creativity. Instead, it showed how `mundane’ the creative process behind their great masterpieces often was. This revelation is the same with a musical forgery: if a forger can compose music as great as, and indistinguishable from, the original, then we have to entertain one of two possibilities. Either the forger also received divine inspiration, or that the original music is not the product of divine inspiration after all. Either way, the forger becomes compositionally indistinguishable from the master.

Next, the performance aspect of music that this dissertation has touched upon demands further exploration. No art form other than music has a highly prescriptive allographic notation coupled with interpretative performance: painting is fixed in its material form and ontology, and dance is conversely based in its physical performance, yet neither combines both.33 It is straightforward to consider a forgery of either a score or a performance, but both together is more challenging. A forgery of a musical score is not dissimilar to a forgery of literature: as discussed, it is simply an issue of ’sameness of spelling’ and an intention to deceive. Yet, when we consider the performance element of music the picture becomes more clouded. Is there a responsibility on the performers themselves in the performance of a forged work?34 On the one hand, the music itself may be of extremely high quality, yet never played because it has the label of forgery, as is the case with the Haydn Keyboard Sonatas. On the other hand, the audience may well feel outraged if they later discover a piece they heard in concert was not by the composer they imagined. Alternatively, if they are told before the concert that the piece is not, in fact, by Haydn, but by an unknown Austrian flautist, they are almost certainly going to have a prejudice against the work before they even hear it.

Performance can also be considered from the perspective of duplicable and repeatable art forms. If, as Roman Ingarden argues, we take painting as a performance of the artist’s idea, then this performance is duplicable: an exact copy of the painting is a duplication of the performance.35 At this level, music is identical: if the score is, in the Ingardenian sense, the performance of the composer’s idea, then a duplication of the score is a duplication of the performance. However, this is as far as the similarity goes. In painting, the next stage in the artwork’s existence is its direct appreciation by the audience; in music though, the music is given a live performance or recording, which is then in turn appreciated by the listener.36 This then gives the musical score a one-to-many mapping of interpretative possibilities – the audience not only has to appreciate the music as a score, but also the particular performance they are listening to. In painting or sculpture, there is only one definitive performance of the artwork, the artwork itself; in music, there are many. Therefore, we are faced with the possibility of not simply forging the artwork in one way or another, but also of forging a performance. This may seem a ludicrous concept, yet with modern technology and recordings it is possible. When retired concert pianist Joyce Hatto died of cancer in June 2006, her husband soon released a disc of her greatest recordings. The Guardian praised the discs `that in quantity, musical range and consistent quality has been equalled by few pianists in history’.37 Yet, it soon transpired that her husband had taken recordings of other pianists and passed them of as his wife’s, as none of hers survived. What is fascinating is comparing the critical response to the original recordings, by the pianists who actually played, and Hatto’s forgery. The originals were described as nothing special or extraordinary, yet, due to Hatto’s name (and, probably, her tragic death), they became highly acclaimed. The work was identical in both cases.38

Why a Forgery Matters

A musical forgery raises a great number of aesthetic questions and poses many dilemmas. In this section, the difficulties that a forgery poses within several aesthetic domains will be shown, and, in some cases, possible answers explored. Yet, aesthetics alone often cannot fully answer many of the questions posed, principally because forgery is as much a social phenomenon as it is an artistic or aesthetic one. Therefore, alongside aesthetic considerations, this section will draw upon several prominent social theories to shed more light on the complex situations that musical forgeries place us in.

Before delving into aesthetic and social considerations, it is necessary to define the premises and boundaries of this exploration. First, our involvement with music is a deeply personal experience; it is not a one-way transmission from artist through artwork to audience. The audience, ourselves, must put as much into the musical experience as we gain from it: in order to comprehend music fully we cannot be passively engaged, we must be active. Second, this section will work on the basic premise that forgeries are more than a dismissible side effect of our musical culture. Forgery will be used as a tool for exploring our relationship with musical composition and performance, which, in turn, will lead to a greater understanding of this relationship. This section does not aim to provide a thorough exploration of all the aesthetic possibilities of musical forgeries; instead, it will select a handful of the most promising, perhaps as an indication of ways the discussion could be taken further – namely, suspicion, creativity, hermeneutics, knowledge, imagination, and interpretation. The considerations themselves do not aim to be comprehensive aesthetic workings, but instead to locate the branches of aesthetics that are affected most by forgeries.

Our Suspicions

There is a central aspect of a musical forgery that has very little written about it: that is, when is a forgery a forgery? A forgery has its own life, its own reception history, its own critical response, its own Wirkungsgeschichte.

L. B. Cebik argues that it is only at the moment of suspicion that the label of `forgery’ means anything.39 When a piece of music is believed to be genuine no-one thinks twice about doubting its author; when it has been proved to be a forgery, it has either been accepted in its own right, or, more commonly, simply discarded. It is only at the moment of suspicion that the forgery really takes hold in the imagination. Suspicion itself, before the music may or may not be proved a forgery, can determine our possibility for aesthetic response. Indeed, as Cebik notes, suspicion does not alter our aesthetic responses and judgements, it replaces them. Francis Sparshott agrees: `It is only at and around the moment of exposure that the forgery disturbs: in growing suspicion, in the shock of disclosure, in readjustment to the new relationship’.40 The danger Sparshott predicts is the possibility for `cynical disillusionment that precludes future deceit, only by believing and trusting nothing’.41 A suspected forgery steals our confidence: not simply our confidence in the music, but, more significantly, in ourselves. In the words of Cebik, `We no longer know how to respond to the work, either cognitively or emotively. Where once we took the work and ourselves for granted, we must now question both. Definition dissolves into vagary. Quest and question replace our former confidence’.42 This lack of confidence precludes aesthetic response: we are reluctant to involve ourselves in aesthetic considerations; instead, we prefer to respond to the work with questions, questions that form a `veritable barrier’ between the work and ourselves.43

Furthermore, our lack of confidence undermines and questions our normal frameworks for aesthetic response. Where we would normally be able to draw on our previous knowledge of the composer, the genre, the period, or the response of peers, critics, or musicologists, we are now cast out to sea: critics, musicians, and audiences all have to become their own interpreters. As Cebik puts most succinctly, `[music] goes the way of religion when every man is his own priest: self-confidence, except as veneer or shrill protestation, disappears. The suspicion of forgery can wreak havoc among those dependant on art’.44

Proving a Musical Forgery

This leads to a key consideration for forgeries: the amount, and types, of proof that we require to overcome our suspicions and believe that a piece of music is either a forgery or not. The amount of proof required is the amount it would take for us to give up our previously held beliefs about the piece and adopt new ones.45 This depends on how deeply we held our previous belief. To the amateur it may not be such a difficulty to accept that a particular piece is not by Haydn; to Robbins Landon, someone who has invested a huge amount in the piece is, it would naturally take a lot more persuading.

The amount of proof required is different and unique for everyone, as every individual has their own investment in any given artwork; furthermore, there is unlikely to ever be a definitive, conclusive method of proving originality in any art form, let alone music. Methods, however, do exist. In fine art, a business worth billions of dollars, a great deal of time and money has been spent on creating scientific methods for detecting forgeries.46 These can often prove incontrovertibly a great many of the biographical parameters associated with a painting. These same techniques can be applied to music, but only to the original scores as physical objects, not to the content signified by the score. As with paintings, being able to accurately say when and where a piece was written does not prove a particular author, it only rules out possibilities. With music, and not with painting, a work can exist in our canon even though we do not have the original manuscript. It is common, as with Bach’s `Cello Suites’, for the original manuscript to be lost and for us to be left only with later copies. In these situations, we are forced to make a judgement of authenticity based purely on the notes and markings on a page, and it is here that we run into difficulties.

Forging the Creative, the Inspired, the Original, and the Genius

Let us now consider the first of the aesthetic domains that musical forgeries challenge: creativity, inspiration, originality, and the genius. As a starting point, we shall take the definition of creativity to be the capacity of a composer to generate ideas or music that are both new and positively valuable.47 There are many postulations on the origins of creativity, and why a particular composer may be considered `original’. The most common, especially for the musical Romantics, is that of a composer receiving divine inspiration.48 God himself is able to speak though the artist into his music, creating works of profound aesthetic value. We, the audience, therefore believe we are hearing not the work of a mere mortal, but an expression of the almighty, a composing force that transcends the composer himself. As such, we elevate the composer and his music to a status above all others, to that of genius. If we believe that creativity and originality are descendant from the divine, then we are forced into a dichotomy over the imitative forgeries of such creativity. Mozart is often perceived as being `the voice of God’, that his music speaks not his own voice, but that of the almighty.49 Now, if I was able to compose music in the style of Mozart, that audiences, critics, and musicologists accepted to be by Mozart, and then at a later date it transpired to be a forgery, we a forced into one of two resulting conclusions. One, I too had received divine inspiration for my composition, and therefore, my music would deserve the same elevated status as Mozart’s. Two, we are forced to accept that neither Mozart nor myself received divine inspiration, an equally unwelcome conclusion since this undermines our belief in Mozart as a `genius’. Forgery suggests, therefore, that inspiration cannot be the sole consideration for our understanding of the creative genius, greatly undermining the Romantic’s beliefs about the creative artist.

Hence, we must consider the socio-cultural context of the forger into our understanding of creativity. At a most basic level, an artist is inexorably linked to the techniques of his period. For Haydn, his work can be considered original because it pushes the technical boundaries of his period: orchestration, vocal ability and range may all be stretched, and it is the masterly, positively valuable, manner with which he does so that we recognise as greatness. For a modern day forger, however, these technical matters no longer represent a difficulty. Orchestras can play Haydn, singers can sing Haydn, and audiences can appreciate Haydn; the modern forger does not need to overcome the same technical barriers, and it is this dichotomy between `then’ and `now’ that justifies us favouring Haydn. When we move beyond the technical realm and into the musical, we can really see how this relates to forgery. Margaret Bowden argues that creativity occurs within a `conceptual space’: a particular artistic or stylistic tradition or school in which the composer operates.50 Creativity can take one of two forms. One is `exploratory creativity’: creativity that explores the edges and boundaries of the conceptual space, testing what can be done within the existing style, then finding new areas and directions in which to take music. Two, argues Boden, is `transformational creativity’: creativity, which, once having explored the current conceptual space, sets out to transform and redefine it. In both cases, there is a direct correlation between the composer’s existing conceptual space, and his perceived `creativity’. Haydn, it could be argued, engaged in both forms of creativity and originality, and, therefore, we can recognise the achievement in his music. A forgery of Haydn is not recognised as an achievement of originality, or at least not in the same way that Haydn’s is, because the conceptual space that the forger occupies is markedly different from Haydn’s. We no longer need to explore or transform the same space the Haydn did, precisely because Haydn has already done so. A forgery of Haydn does not, therefore, need to engage in the same creativity; hence, we have grounds to be unimpressed by it, even if it was sonically accepted as `sounding like Haydn’. The forgery is misrepresented creative achievement.

The Hermeneutics of a Forgery

A consideration of the historicist hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer can take this discussion in new directions. Since Gadamer claims all understanding takes place though the medium of language, the diverse art forms of music, literature, poetry, and painting all operate at the same syntactical level.51 His meditations on the hermeneutics of language apply equally to music, and, most relevantly, to musical forgeries. Gadamer asserts that engaging with an artwork is analogous to a conversation: the artwork does not simply dictate its meaning to us at one instance of time, but rather, we also engage with the artwork, asking questions of it, coming closer to a more profound understanding of its possible meanings.52 Central to Gadamer’s hermeneutics is the concept of our `horizon’. Although we may try, when we listen to a piece of music we cannot abandon our own horizon and transpose ourselves into that of the composer or audience from the past. Our contemporary values and beliefs that Gadamer terms our ‘prejudgements’ are necessary conditions for understanding. If, as is normally the case, we become aware of the limits of our context-bound prejudgements when listening to music, we will attempt to fuse our own horizon with that of the believed composer. If I listen to a piece of Haydn, I will naturally attempt not only to hear Haydn on my terms – post-romantic and post-tonal, but also on his – pre-romantic and within a tonal tradition. The socio-cultural context of a composition is an integral part of our aesthetic understanding of it. Now, chronologically, no two forgeries of Haydn are identical. There may be one composed during Haydn’s lifetime, another a hundred years later, and another yesterday. It would be naïve to believe that we value them all the same. For Gadamer, the meaning of a text becomes less accessible as it recedes into the past. The issues that forgeries pose to creativity are not restricted to contemporary forgeries, but, in differing degrees to any forgery. What is defining is the relative chronological distance between the genuine, the forgery, and us. As the forgery recedes into the past it becomes more acceptable, as we no longer attempt to consider it on our own contemporary terms, but instead as being closer to that of the original’s. Therefore, as time progresses, we gradually recognise more of the creativity in the forgery. Consider our ability to fuse horizons with particular styles and epochs: it is a statistical certainty that we will be more equipped to deal with Haydn’s `horizon’ than we would of any contemporary composer, simply because we have had 200 years more practice. If a lesser composer were to write a piece 10 years after Haydn’s death, claiming it to be by Haydn, we would be much more likely to accept it than we would a forgery made today, simply because the horizon of the forger is closer to the original than to our own.

Forging Knowledge, Taking Power

Music is widely accepted as a source of knowledge; music can teach us about a composer, a historical period, emotional states, and ourselves. The latter of these are of particular value to an audience – many people want to leave a piece of music feeling that not only do they understand the music better, but also themselves.

Eileen John highlights three prerequisites for art to be considered a source of knowledge, all of which are applicable to music.53 First, learning from music requires a degree of awareness of what the new knowledge may be. This is closely related to Gadamer’s concept of the prejudgements that we bring to an artwork; we have certain expectations about what the music is going to tell us, and how we are going to appropriate that knowledge. Second, the music must be able to provide some justification for itself as a source of knowledge, and for the knowledge it imparts. There must be a reason to trust the artwork, and allow it to change, alter, or replace our existing beliefs. Third, the learning process should enhance the music in return: in learning something about the composer or ourselves, we will in turn better understand and appreciate the music. Although the term `learning’ does not necessarily imply that we agree with the knowledge the music is trying to impart, for example, we may not agree with the situation or actions of an opera character, there is still cognitive stimulation. Surely the very reason we have musicology at all is because we believe that music makes a demand to be comprehended and understood, in the same way that we believe noise does not.

Let us consider the place of forgery within John’s prerequisites for knowledge. Her first condition, that the listener must have some expectation about what they are going to learn, is valid. When we go to a concert and see that the first item is Mozart’s Overture to The Magic Flute, our minds prepare us, even if only at the subconscious level, with the correct tools to `understand’ the music. We know we are going to hear something tonal, so, from hearing other tonal works, we know how tonal music of the eighteenth-century syntactically operates and expresses. We recognise that it is an overture to an opera, so we call upon our knowledge of the operatic canon and the role of the overture for Mozart, and so on. When we hear the music, our prejudgements are either confirmed or expanded, but rarely utterly broken. This, in turn, builds trust in our prejudgements, and thus they become stronger the next time we hear tonal music, an opera, or a Mozart overture. What a forgery does to this is profound: we are forced to question all our prejudgements for learning. What we thought were safe conceptual tools for understanding Mozart go out the window: we are forced to radically rethink the relationship between Mozart and tonality, between the music and the knowledge we believe it is attempting to impart.

John’s second condition is then questioned: not only do we doubt the knowledge the `forgery’ is offering, but we no longer respect the right the forgery has to make that claim.54 We are unable to trust the artwork, because, as shown earlier, we enter into an escalation of suspicion. We are no longer willing to allow the music to inform our views on Haydn, as the music is not in fact by Haydn. Therefore, even if the music is in the style of Haydn, the views it was trying to express are no longer justifiable as Haydn’s own.

In reference to John’s third point, the forgery of Haydn does not enhance our experience of the music – the genuine or the forgery. Dealing with the forgery, we do not gain a greater understanding of the music if the two preceding conditions for learning have not been satisfied: whilst we may learn something from the forgery, we are not sure what it may be, as the knowledge itself is decontextualised. If the knowledge were believed to be a `factual’ expression of the composer, than we can instantly dismiss this knowledge as false, just as we do with the claim of authorship. If the knowledge were `experimental’ – relating to our imagination – then the link between our reality and the imaginary world is no longer sustainable. Moreover, if the knowledge were a form of `moral message’, then the awareness that the music is a forgery instantly makes us doubt that the work has any moral value whatsoever, let alone anything useful. Additionally, the forgery has an effect on our future engagement with the genuine. We have lost the innocent trust in our prejudgements; we continually question ourselves, and it becomes increasingly more difficult for us to allow other works by the genuine composer to alter, change or replace our existing beliefs. We isolate our previously held beliefs in an attempt to prevent further false knowledge contaminating the well of the existing.

These considerations of knowledge lead us into the issue of power. We can accept that music can have power over us; we can remember instances of being transfixed and under the influence of a particular performance. Power and knowledge are intertwined both in the arts and in many other social domains. In art, power is surely derived from the artwork’s control over the presentation of the `truth’; in music, the temporal unfolding of events creates a discourse that we, the audience, are unable to control. The power music has over us is, in a very real sense, the ability of the composer to determine what knowledge should be imparted to us, and when. Foucault has argued that power has essentially two roles: either, as an oppressive force, or, a liberating one.55 Art, music, or more specifically genuine music, falls into the latter – the power of music is in liberating itself and us, it is capable of teaching and forming new understandings. A forgery, however, turns music into the former, of an oppressive force. The act of forgery on the part of the forger is an abuse of the power of music: it is no longer used to impart `truths’, but to demonstrate deception.

Forging the Imagination

One of the greatest abilities of art, and, in particular, music, is its ability to allow us to imagine. As a non-representational art form, music calls on the imagination more than any other discipline; not just the pictorial imagination, but the emotional as well.56 In a lied we are not simply called upon to imagine birds, brooks, or forests, but the emotional states of the characters, their hopes, anguishes, and loves. Artistic imagination is significant because it is the free play and furthest development of our cognitive and semiotic faculties.57 To take Sparshott’s definition, `Imagination, as conceived in the Aristotelian psychology of action, must be the ability to envisage alternative worlds, worlds conceived as differing from present actuality in certain interesting particulars but otherwise assumed to be like the world we know. To use one’s imagination is to envisage a world that is interestingly different from our own but also interestingly accessible from it‘.58 The imaginary reality we enter when we listen to music has to be directly descendant from our own reality.

In the first instance, the rules of our reality become the rules of our imagination, unless we are given reason to adopt new ones. There is also an additional `reality’, which, to use Gadamer’s terminology, could be labelled the reality of the composer’s horizon. When we listen to music we combine several realities: we exist in our own current reality, then attempt to merge this with our perception of the composer’s reality, and finally, from this combination we are able to construct the world inhabited by the music. It is within this constructed reality, based on the composer’s and our realities that we let our imaginations loose and, in turn gain cognitive enjoyment from the music.

The difficulties that a forgery, or the suspicion of forgery, posses to this musical reality are clear: forgery has the unparalleled ability to collapse our imaginary world from within. We are forced to question the framework within which we imagine events within the musical world; where we thought it was safe to imagine a relationship between two characters, between two musical phrases, or the significance of a particular harmonic progression, we are left sure of nothing. At a more complex level, the destruction of our framework for imaginary perception is not isolated to or contained by the forgery that perpetrates it: we also question the rules of our own musical reality that we took for granted in the first place. The breakdown of trust in our musical reality leads, as mentioned earlier, to a state of perpetual cynicism. Of all our cognitive capacities, the imagination, the power of make-believe, is surely one that relies most on implicit trust and blind belief. We cannot explain or `prove’ our imaginary worlds; our imagination is a personal domain. The more forgeries we encounter, the less willing we become to construct the necessary musical sound worlds in which to imagine, or, at least, we are less willing to trust them.

Interpreting a Forgery

Without entering into the many debates surrounding the validity and scope of our role as interpreters of the music we perform, it can be taken beyond doubt that all musical performance will have to involve a greater or lesser degree of `interpretation’. Interpretation often, arguably always, requires more information and meaning than we can deduce from the notes on the page.59 Therefore, it is common to debate the role of intentionalism as a way of forming musical interpretations. Intentionalist interpretations can take two general forms: as a form of biographical criticism – an attempt to map the composer’s life onto his music; or, a semiotic interpretation – taking music as an expression of, or by, its composer. Dealing with the approach of biographical criticism, there are a number of flaws, irrespective of whether the music is a forgery or not. There is very little reason to believe that a composer’s life should map onto, or directly relate to, his music. Often, a composer will deliberately compose music that does not relate to his own personal circumstances, or he attempts to transcend them. Even if the music and the biography of the composer do seem to correlate, we can never know if this is intentional or mere interpretative circumstance. If, however, one does base an interpretation on the composer’s biography, then a forgery wholly undermines this approach. Any interpretative decision will have its factual component and justification – the biographical relevance of the composer – proven false, which, can only lead to the failing of the interpretation itself.

The second internationalist possibility, to gain understanding of a work from our perception of the composer’s intentions, suffers the same fate as the biographical. Whilst it is, as a method, a much more plausible approach, for we can often know a useful amount about a composer’s intentions (we can assume that if Beethoven wrote a sonata from violin and keyboard, he intended to compose for violin and keyboard – it was not an accident), forgery has the same effect. The composer we believed we were trying to interpret turns out not to be the composer at all. The music is not an expression of the believed composer, but instead a deceitful expression of another.

By logical extension, forgery undermines all arguments of intentionality: `actual intentionalism’, the view that the correct interpretation of an artwork identifies the intention of the artist expressed in the music; pluralist approaches, that, whilst denying the existence of one definitive interpretation, still rely on extra-musical parameters, and are thus forgeable; even `work meaning’ arguments that attempt to locate meaning within the work itself are not immune to the reliance on biographical information, and are thus susceptible to forgery.60 Forgery forces us to question how, and from where, we form our musical interpretations, to accept that we have to rely on information not contained within the score to form an interpretation: even if it is not directly related to a particular composer, it will be related to a period, school or style. In interpreting a Haydn string quartet, we might well decide that certain moments are harmonically more expressive than others, and decide to bring them out.61 In so doing, we are relating the score to the epoch, so we are not able to claim our interpretation comes wholly from within the score.

`Interpretation’ could perhaps better be termed `interpretation of expression’. The basic premise of most expression theories is as follows: 1) the artist or composer is in emotional state E; 2) he produces a composition A that possesses a certain property B; because A possesses B it therefore signifies E.62 The fundamental question is, do 1 and 2 necessarily relate? Is it possible to separate the artist from the emotional content of a work? One answer is that we recognise that a piece of music is expressive by our knowledge of the artist – we understand that a particular chord or melody is intended to be expressive as we understand the significance of the event within the context of the artist. A forgery does undermines this belief – a forgery can still be expressive, even though we discover that the artist who we believed was in emotional state E was not the artist at all. The question is then not does music express, but are we convinced that the expression we perceive is the `correct’ one? We wonder whether, without the correct artistic context, we are feeling the correct emotions. Therefore, art is not a direct expression of an artist; rather, when listening to music we construct an imaginary, quasi-anonymous, artist or composer who is expressing through the music. It is not the expression of the artist, but what we believe an artist could be expressing, a relationship forgery forces us to face.

Conclusions

Forgeries have existed in music for centuries. Yet, even today they are something of an enigma; they continually elude definition and categorisation. There are two key hinderances to such a definition or understanding. The first is an ontological barrier: there simply is no such thing as a forgery of Art; there is only a forgery of an art. Every art form has its own unique associated forgeries, that operate in different ways to those in other arts. Music especially, adds a wealth of complications and distinctions not found in paintings: its dual ontology, performance, improvisation, allographic status, and its hard to answer questions of originality make forgery a thorny issue.

Yet musical forgeries are also an awaking call for musicians and audiences. They force us, like no other artistic phenomenon, to question the very cognitive and emotional frameworks we take for granted. Our perceptions of musical creativity, greatness, interpretation and expression are all thrown into question, and often dismantled. How much do we really know about a particular composer’s style, if it can be easily forged? Or, is it not forgery, but the actual act of being deceived, that offends us? The hardest part is not discovering that one of our favourite works, for Robbins Landon the Haydn Keyboard Sonatas, is a forgery, but forgiving it. It is only by forgiving that we can find any possible aesthetic enjoyment.

Does forgery bring music and reality closer together, or drive them further apart? The answer is both. A forgery brutally demonstrates to us that not only does art represent a society in the positive sense, but also in the negative. Similarly, our treasured detachment and pleasure in the escapist qualities of music are undermined: the safe assumptions of authorship and context we employ to appreciate music are destroyed, and we are left with an art that inhabits the real world. Therefore, a forgery could become the very thing it rebels against: the abstraction of the composer. Forgery brings to the very fore our beliefs about the composer of a work, and, our concern for the establishment of the correct author replaces our enjoyment of the forgery itself. Echoing calls for the `death of the author’, a forgery forces a wedge between its inherent aesthetic values independent of its author, and its actual or believed author.63 A forgery dares us to abandon our concerns for authenticity and social or historical accuracy, and instead, accept a composition at face value, as an immediate and present sensation.

For musicology, a forgery, or even the possibility of a forgery must make us question a great deal. A great amount of conformational analysis is thrown into question: how can analysis demonstrate an incontrovertible link between a society or style and its musical exponents, when a subsequent forgery can prove it false? The implications of forgery are that a great deal of our musical scholarship amounts to little more than self-parody. When one of the worlds leading musicologists, Robbins Landon, cannot distinguish between genuine Haydn and a forgery, we should not be asking why he cannot, but why it matters at all, if the forgery is as enjoyable as the genuine. Let us enjoy the forgeries as music.

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Derek Matravers, `Art, expression, and emotion’, in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 445-457 (Routledge, New York, 2002).
[57]
Jack Meiland, `Originals, copies, and aesthetic value’, in Stein Haugom Olsen and Peter Lamarque, eds., Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition, 375-383 (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004).
[58]
Leonard Meyer, Forgery and the Anthropology of Art (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967).
[59]
Kirk Pillow, `Versions and forgeries: A response to kivy’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 60, no. 2, (2002), 177-179.
[60]
Kirk Pillow, `Did goodman’s distinction survive lewitt?’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 61, no. 4, (2003), 356-380.
[61]
Theodore Rousseau, `The stylistic detection of forgeries’, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 6, (1968), 247-252.
[62]
Mary Ann Smart, `In praise of convention: Formula and experiment in bellini’s self-borrowings’, Journal of the American Musicological Society, vol. 53, no. 1, (2000), 25-68.
[63]
Francis Sparshott, `Some questions for danto’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 35, no. 1, (1976), 79-80.
[64]
Francis Sparshott, `The disappointed art lover’, in Denis Dutton, ed., The Forger’s Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art (University of Califormia Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983).
[65]
Francis Sparshott, `Why artworks have no right to have rights’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 42, no. 1, (1983), 5-15.
[66]
Francis Sparshott, `Imagination: The very idea’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 48, no. 1, (1990), 1-8.
[67]
Nan Stalnaker, `Fakes and forgeries’, in Berys Gaut and Dominic Mclver Lopes, eds., The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 517 (Routledge, New York, 2002).
[68]
Robert Stecker, `Interpretation’, in Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, eds., The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 321-335 (Routledge, New York, 2002).
[69]
Hans Tietze, `The psychology and aesthetics of forgery in art’, Metropolitan Museum Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, (1934), 1-19.
[70]
Robert Wicks, `Foucault’, in Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, eds., The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (Routledge, New York, 2002).
[71]
Richard Wollheim, `Art, interpretation, and perception’, in Dieter Henrich, ed., Kant oder Hegel uber Formen der Begrundung in der Philosophie, 549-559 (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1983).
[72]
Michael Wreen, `Goodman on forgery’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 133, (1983), 340-353.

Footnotes:

1Eric Hoffer, The Passionate State of the Mind, and Other Aphorisms (Harper and Row: New York, 1955).

2Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (Verso: London, 1981).

3Quoted in Michael Beckerman, `All Right, Maybe Haydn Didn’t Write Them. So What?’, New York Times, May 15th 1994.

4BBC Music Magazine, January 1994.

5Beckerman, ‘All Right’.

6Beckerman, `All Right’.

7Beckerman, `All Right’.

8See Theodore Albrecht ed., `Mozart’ in Salieri: Rival of Mozart (Lowell Press: Missouri, 1989), 84-99.

9Beckerman, `All Right’.

10For Mozart, Handel, and Bach, see Georges de Saint-Foix, `A propos d’un Concerto attribué a Mozart‘, Revue de Musicologie, Vol. 19, Nos. 66/67 (May – August, 1938), 101-102, and `Marius Casadesus (in Obituary)’, The Musical Times, Vol. 122, No. 1666 (December, 1981), 843. For others, see Clyo Jackson, `Pseudonymity: A Modern Case’, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October, 1940), 390-391. There is also suspicion surrounding a great many other works, for example Haydn’s 2nd Horn Concerto and others, see Georg Feder, ‘Joseph Haydn: Work List’ in The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians ed. Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell (Oxford University Press: London, 2001).

11For example, the Romans made copies of Greek sculptures to sell as originals.

12For a discussion of this process of commodification, see Simon Jarvis, `Adorno, Marx, Materialism’, or Lydia Goehr, `Dissonant Works and a Listening Public’ in Cambridge Companion to Adorno ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004).

13See `Sotheby’s £94.9m Art Sale Breaks European Record’, The Guardian, February 6th 2007.

14Paul Baker, `Policing Fakes’, presented at the Art Crime: Protecting Art, Protecting Artists and Protecting Consumers Conference convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology, held in Sydney, 2-3 December 1999.

15Alfred Lessing, `What is Wrong with a Forgery?’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 23, No.4 (Summer, 1965), 461-495.

16For a summary, see Joseph Margolis, `A Closer Look at Danto’s Account of Art and Perception’, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July, 2000), 326-350, or Denis Dutton, `Authenticity in Art’ in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003).

17Lessing, `What is Wrong’; Denis Dutton, `Artistic Crimes: The Problem of Forgery in the Arts’, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1979), 302-314; Ross Bowden, `What is Wrong with an Art Forgery: An Anthropological Perspective’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 57, No. 3 (1999), 333-343.

18Or, at best, they assume a relevance of `forgery’ only to painting, at the expense of other arts. See, for example, Lessing `What is Wrong’, or Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, 1976). Of course, writers have acknowledged the difficulties in this `umbrella’ approach, including Goodman in his own work.

19This is different from claiming that there is something inherent within the artwork itself; forgery is a label applied to a neutral artwork. See Francis Sparshott, `Why Artworks Have No Right to Have Rights’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Autumn, 1983), 5-15.

20For the Appearance Theory see Jack Meiland, `Originals, Copies, and Aesthetic Value’ in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition ed. Stein Haugom Olsen and Peter Lamarque (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2004), 375-383, and Richard Wollheim, `Art, Interpretation, and Perception’ in Kant oder Hegel uber Formen der Begrundung in der Philosophie, Dieter Henrich ed. (Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart, 1983), 549-559. For the Cognitive Stock argument, see Leonard Meyer, `Forgery and the Anthropology of Art,’ in Music, the Arts, and Ideas (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1967), and Andrew Harrison, `Works of Art and Other Cultural Objects’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1967-8), 105-128. For a summary, see Nan Stalnaker, `Fakes and Forgeries’ in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic Mclver Lopes (Routledge: New York, 2002), 517.

21Goodman, Languages of Art.

22Goodman, Languages of Art, 99 – 112.

23Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Harvard University Press: Boston, 1981).

24Of course, we can but try. See the proponents of the Appearance Theory, and Lessing, `What is Wrong’.

25Denis Dutton, `Forgery and Plagiarism’ in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics ed. by Ruth Chadwick (San Diego Academic Press: San Diego, 1998).

26Goodman, Languages of Art, 113.

27Jerrold Levinson, `Autographic and Allographic Artworks Revisited’, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (November, 1980), 367-383.

28There is, however, some contradiction that is not always acknowledged between different authors on the scope and definition of `forgery’. Compare Goodman and Danto, for example.

29Sparshott, `Why Artworks’.

30See Dominic McIver Lopes, `The Ontology of Interactive Art’, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), 65-81, and James Lindenschmidt, `Chasing the Vivid Event: The Ontology and Aesthetics of Improvised Music’, PhD Thesis (University of Southern Maine, 2002).

31John Daverio, Crossing Paths: Schubert, Schumann and Brahms (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002).

32Mary Ann Smart, `In Praise of Convention: Formula and Experiment in Bellini’s Self-Borrowings’, Journal of the American Musicological Society, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2000), 25-68.

33Julie Van Camp, `The Ontology of Dance’ in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics ed. Michael Kelley (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 399-402.

34Comparatively, should museums display forgeries in their galleries?

35Roman Ingarden, The Ontology of the Work of Art trans. by Raymond Meyer with John Goldthwait (Ohio University Press: Athens, Ohio, 1989).

36One could argue that the manner in which the painting is presented to the viewer, in a gallery for example, is in itself a form of performance.

37Jeremy Nicholas, ‘Joyce Hatto’, The Guardian, July 10th 2006.

38See Ben Hoyle, `Piano `Genius’ is Branded a Fake’, The Times, February 17th 2007.

39L. B. Cebik, `On the Suspicion of an Art Forgery’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), 147-156.

40Francis Sparshott, `The Disappointed Art Lover’ in The Forger’s Art ed. Denis Dutton (University of Califormia Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), quoted in Cebik, `On the Suspicion’.

41Sparshott, `The Disappointed’, quoted in Cebik, `On the Suspicion’.

42Cebik, `On the Suspicion’, 148.

43Cebik, `On the Suspicion’, 148.

44Cebik, `On the Suspicion’, 151.

45Cebik, `On the Suspicion’, 148.

46For example, see B. Keisch, R. Feller, A. Levine, A, P. Edwards, `Dating and Authenticating Works of Art by Measurement of Natural Alpha Emitters’, Science, Vol. 155 (March 1967), 1238-1241.

47Of course, valuable can have a wide range of meanings: aesthetically valuable to a particular audience, technically valuable to the development of an instrument, compositionally valuable as a new form or structure, and so on.

48See Frederick Burwick, `Genius, Madness, and Inspiration’ in Poetic Madness and the Romantic Imagination (The Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania, 1996), 21-43.

49See Peter Kivy, `The Genius and The Child’ in The Possessor and the Possessed: Handel, Mozart, Beethoven, and the Idea of Musical Genius (Yale University Press: Yale, 2001), 57-78.

50Margaret Bowden, `Creativity’ in The Routledge Companion, 477-489.

51Ian Mackenzie, `Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the Use of Forgery’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1986), 41-48.

52Gadamer does not believe, as others before him did, that it was possible to fully understand a text. Instead, a meeting point is reached between the text and the reader. See John Connolly, `Gadamer and The Author’s Authority: A Language Game Approach’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Spring, 1986), 271-277, 271.

53Eileen John, `Art and Knowledge’ in The Routledge Companion, 417-431

54Also, see Francis Sparshott, `Why Artworks’.

55Michael Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, ed. P. Rainbow, trans. R. Hurley (Penguin: London, 1997), 261, quoted in Robert Wicks, `Foucault’, 209.

56The term `non-representational’ is used in the Schopenhauerian sense; see Lawrence Ferrara, `Schopenhauer on Music as the Embodiment of Will’ in Schopenhauer, Philosophy and the Arts (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996).

57Francis Sparshott, `Imagination: The Very Idea’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), 1-8, 3.

58Sparshott, `Imagination’, 7.

59Robert Stecker, `Interpretation’ in The Routledge Companion, 321-335.

60See Stecker, `Interpretation’.

61For example, Ethan Haimo, `Remote Keys and Multi-Movement Unity: Haydn in the 1790s’, The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 2 (1990), 242-268, or L. Poundie Burstein, `Surprising Returns: The VII Sharp in Beethoven’s Op. 18 No. 3, and Its Antecedents in Haydn’, Music Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 3 (October, 1998), 295-312.

62Derek Matravers, `Art, Expression, and Emotion’ in The Routledge Companion, 445-457, 446. There are a number of common challenges raised against expression theories, including problems of works produced over many years, or later revisions.

63Michel Foucault `What is an Author?’ trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Cornell University Press: New York, 1977).

Violin RSI: Some tips for curing

Tuesday, May 27th, 2008

Hello. This post title probably implies yet another cliched first blog post. I guess, in a way it is: hello, welcome to my new blog.

Yet, at the same time it isn’t. You see, I recently (a few weeks ago) developed RSI (Repititive Strain Injury) from typing up my dissertation and practicing the violin too much. I typed some 25000 words in about 10 days, all whilst doing 3/4 hours of playing a day. Considering the strain I was probably putting on the fine motor control in my fingers, coupled with pretty bad typing posture, it hardly seems surprising that my hands gave up on me.

Having been to see the doctor a few times, several physiotherapists, and talking to other people who’ve had similar injuries, there’s several things I’d recommend computer ‘geeks’ like me do to avoid permenant damage:

  1. Absolutely make sure you’re posture is good. Like playing the piano, make sure you sit squarely at your desk, with both hands equally elevated, and both wrists higher than your fingers. The damage happens when you raise your fingers above your wrists, pulling your hand backwards.
  2. I love apple, but their old iMac keyboards suck. I just bought a new one (the really flat, low profile ones), and its already much better to type with.
  3. Stretch. Essentially, whatever muscles you continually use, stretch them regularly in the inverse. For the violin that means ‘unwinding’ your left hand in the opposite contortion to how you play. The same applies for typing.

This said, it still doesn’t explain the title of this post. “Hello World” is a reference to the fact that I am actually dictating this post to my Mac, rather than typing it. The last time I used any dictation software was years ago with IMB’s ViaVoice, and whatever it may be now, then, it was awful. But, this MacDicate I’m using now is actually doing a pretty good job. It’s picking up words fine, and obviously letting me dictate straight into Firefox (and Mail, Word etc.). It doesn’t work for code, though how you’d teach a dictation program to do so I don’t know.

If there’s anyone reading this it would be great to hear from you (comments below), or anyone that’s got RSI from typing or music…